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OVERVIEW 
 
This research project focuses on the cognitive process of rumination and its association to 
depression. Part one of the project is a literature review, which aimed to provide a 
comprehensive summary of the current state of research on the relations between rumination 
and the major cognitive processes in people with depression. A systematic search identified 25 
studies in the existing literature which fulfilled the basic requirements of studying rumination and 
at least one other cognitive process with valid measure(s) or experimental manipulations in 
people with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. These studies covered 8 domains of 
cognitive deficits and biases related to rumination. They included overgeneralised memory, 
memory biases, thinking biases, attentional biases, inhibitory deficits, impairments in general 
resource allocation, maladaptive thought control strategies, and problem-solving deficits. The 
review investigated the conclusions made by these studies in terms of their suggestions on the 
interrelations between depressive symptoms, rumination, the cognitive process in question. 
Particular attention was paid to each study‘s conceptualisation of rumination, and whether it 
addressed subcomponents of rumination which underlie its negative effects. 
Part two consisted of the empirical paper. The empirical study focussed on the ability of one 
particular hypothesis - the mood-as-input model -to explain the mechanisms underlying the 
perseverative thinking style which characterised depressive rumination. Using a rumination 
interview paradigm, it compared participants with major depressive disorder (MDD) with healthy 
controls for the extent of their perseverative thinking during the rumination task. The 
performance of each participant in both the depressed and control group was also measured 
and contrasted across two experimental conditions. In each these conditions, participants were 
asked to adopt either an ‗as-much-as-can‖ or a ―feel-like-continuing‖ stop-rule as guidelines for 
decision making on how and when to terminate the task. Results indicated that the interaction of 
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depressive symptoms and ‗stop-rule‘ significantly influenced perseveration in all participants. 
Participants‘ changes of mood during the rumination task, as well as their spontaneous 
selection of stop-rule in their daily life were also explored. 
Finally, the critical appraisal in part three offered a reflection on the my motivations for 
undertaking this research and some reasons for the important decisions made in the process. It 
also provided further discussions on the designs and methodologies of the experimental study, 
and the research and clinical implications of its findings.  
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Abstract 
Aims: This review article summarised existing studies which investigated the associations 
between rumination and other cognitive processes in people with depression. Methods: A 
systematic literature search was undertaken to identify studies which examined rumination and 
at least one form of cognitive deficit or bias using valid measurements and/or experimental 
manipulations. The selected studies all included participants with a diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder or a current major depressive episode in their samples. Results: A total of 
25 studies fitted the inclusion criteria. They covered rumination and other cognitive processes 
across 8 domains, which included overgeneralised memory, memory biases, thinking biases, 
attentional biases, inhibitory deficits, impairments in general resource allocation, maladaptive 
thought control strategies, and problem-solving deficits. All of these processes corresponded to 
the common cognitive correlates of depression. Conclusions: Results indicated that these 
cognitive biases and deficits relate differentially to different sub-components of rumination, thus 
reinforcing the hypothesis that rumination is not a unitary construct. However, the diversity of 
ruminative processes had not been addressed by the majority of the reviewed studies. The 
present findings presented various cognitive mechanisms that might be underlying the 
detrimental effects of maladaptive rumination, but current discussions on the nature of these 
mechanisms remained inconclusive. A number of general suggestions on research designs and 
methodological recommendations for specific studies were discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
The role of rumination in depression 
 
Rumination typically refers to a process of perseverative thinking that is self-focussed, recursive 
and persistent in nature. Substantial evidence now suggests that rumination is a central 
component of affective disorders, in particular depression (see Thomsen, 2006). The concept of 
rumination is therefore considered important to the continuing development of both the cognitive 
theory of and psychological interventions for depression. However, despite the robust literature, 
there is not a clear and agreed definition of rumination. Different theorists have debated the 
ways in which rumination is linked to depressive symptoms, as well as to other cognitive 
processes (Smith & Alloy, 2009). There also seems to be a lack of consensual understanding 
on the mechanisms underlying the negative effects of rumination.  
 
Different definitions of rumination  
The most widely applied and supported theory of rumination is the Response Style Theory (RST) 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubormirsky, 2008). In RST, rumination 
is understood as a repetitive style of thinking about the causes, consequences, and symptoms 
of one's negative affects. It is a direct, automatic, and trait-like tendency of responding to 
emotional distress. The Rumination Response Scale (RRS), a subscale in the Response Style 
Questionnaire (RSQ) developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) has been used in the 
majority of relevant studies to measure trait tendency to ruminate in response to depressive 
mood. However, this conceptualisation of rumination has been challenged as emerging findings 
continue to show that distinct processes such as brooding and reflection (Mor & Winquist, 2002; 
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Treynor, Gonzalez and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003); Watkins, 2008) satisfy this definition of 
rumination (e.g. Teasdale & Green, 2004). Therefore, it raises questions about the validity of 
rumination as a unified construct. In fact, recent research supports the idea that rumination 
consists of separate processes.  
Theoretically, the RST proposes a direct relationship between rumination and emotional distress. 
Because of this, it may not have invited rumination research to incorporate the increasing 
evidence that rumination can cause as well as be caused by various cognitive processes. In 
view of these more recent findings, Treynor et al. (2003) attempted to identify different 
dimensions of rumination by factor-analysing the items in the RRS. After removing the items 
which overlapped with general depressive symptoms, they identified two separate factors 
measured by the remainder of the RRS, namely, brooding, a tendency towards moody 
pondering, and reflection, a neutral contemplation on facts. However, some problems remained 
as the authors acknowledged that this distinction accounted for only half of the variance of their 
study‘s data, suggesting more factors are underlying the original concept of rumination.  
Recently, increasing evidence on brooding and reflection has shown that they are differentially 
related to different cognitive processes. For instance, brooding seemed to be related to 
attentional bias for sad faces for people with depression (Joormann, Dkane & Gotlib, 2006), 
reduced inhibition of negative materials in working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010), and 
increased negative cognitive style (Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2008). Reflection was not found to be 
related to any of these cognitive deficits, except for negative cognitive style, which it negatively 
related to. These findings suggested that the various sub-components of rumination may exert 
different effects on depression via separate cognitive processes. 
Another major theory of rumination, the self-regulatory executive function (S-REF) model (Wells 
& Matthews, 1994, 1995), defines rumination in a broader context than the RST. Here, 
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rumination is not a direct and habitual response to low mood, but a partly controlled strategy for 
emotional regulation. It embeds rumination in the structure of a cognitive model of emotional 
self-regulation. This potentially allows for a characterisation of the different mechanisms 
underlying the unhelpful effects of rumination, specifically in terms of their associations with the 
cognitive processes linked to depression. However, so far most rumination studies from this 
perspective are concerned with a particular part of the model, i.e., metacognitions. Therefore, 
the literature has yet to see rumination as conceptualised in S-REF being widely considered. 
One of the reasons for this might be that the multiple measures of rumination as suggested by 
the model do not lend themselves as easy tools for research and data interpretation. 
 
Maladaptive subtypes of Rumination 
Overall, recent research on different subtypes of repetitive and self-focussed thinking has 
shown that they differentially relate to cognitive biases and deficits associated with depression. 
Therefore, these findings generally reinforced the idea that there are both adaptive and 
dysfunctional aspects of rumination. For instance, a series of studies conducted by Watkins and 
colleagues have shown that the induction of evaluative and analytic, as opposed to concrete 
and experiential, self-focussed thinking caused a higher level of over-generalised memory in 
both depressed and healthy (e.g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins, Teasdale, & 
Williams, 2000), as well as formerly depressed individuals (Crane et al., 2007). In addition, a 
study has found that, when compared to concrete self-focussed thinking, it was the abstract and 
less concrete nature of depressive thoughts, rather than the self-focus quality per se, which 
impaired social problem-solving skills in people with depression (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that various cognitive factors may contribute to the 
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detrimental effects of rumination. Hence, depressive rumination may not be a unitary construct. 
However, it is admittedly not reflected by most rumination research to date. 
One of the main concerns of this review is to survey the different ways studies have 
conceptualised rumination. As an examination of rumination‘s various definitions is likely to have 
implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying its negative effects, it may help us 
comprehend the existing evidence on rumination in relation to wider cognitive processes. 
Therefore, it may pave the way for a conceptualisation of rumination based on empirically 
endorsed connections with other depressive cognitions. It is also likely to be clinically valuable, 
as it may illuminate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the maladaptive effect of rumination, 
which psychological interventions could target. For these reasons, it is important that the 
present review attends to studies that addressed the relations between rumination and common 
cognitive processes associated to depression. 
 
Rumination and the Cognitive Correlates of Depression 
A number of reviews have summarised the common cognitive biases and deficits in depression 
(e.g. Matthews & McLeod, 2005; Baune, Miller, McAfoose, Johnson, Quirk & Mitchellm, 2010; 
Joormann & D‘Avanzato, 2010; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010). They outlined the two main areas of 
cognitive correlates of depression, i.e. cognitive biases and general deficits in cognitive 
processes. The specific processes identified so far include biases in recall and 
overgeneralisation in memory (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Teasdale 
& Green, 2004); increased intrusive thoughts (Wenzlaff, 2002); attributional biases (e.g. Lo, Ho 
& Hollon, 2008, 2010); biases in attention, and deficits in executive functions (e.g. Joorman, 
2006; De Lissnyder, et al., 2010); and flexibility in the allocation of general cognitive resources 
(e.g. Levens, Muhtadie, Gotlib 2009).  
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In parallel to the research on cognitive deficits in depression, there has also been a growing 
literature on the connection between rumination and various cognitive processes. In fact, 
research evidence has been showing an increasingly complex picture of how rumination 
associates with common depressive cognitions. However, there has not been any systematic 
review of the existing findings to date.  
 
The Current Review 
In view of this, the current review aims to provide a comprehensive summary of the studies that 
examined how various cognitive processes relate to rumination in the context of depression. In 
reviewing the literature, it was noted that the range of studies exploring rumination and 
depressive cognitive processes has become quite broad. These studies vary in their definitions 
of rumination, as well as how relevant they are to the topic in question in terms of their focuses 
and designs. For example, conclusions about depressive rumination were drawn from studies 
which included measures of rumination as an adjunct to their hypotheses and used non-clinical 
samples with dysphoric moods. In order to ensure the robustness of our findings, the present 
review will consider only studies which included participants who met the criteria for the 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder (MDD). 
It offers a review of their findings, and comments on their design and methodological strengths 
and weaknesses. For this purpose, this review restricts the studies included to those that 
recruited participants who fulfilled the criteria for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder or a 
current depressive episode. It is hoped this will give this critical summary relevance to future 
theoretical research, as well as clinical studies of depressive rumination that seek to identify 
relevant mechanisms that psychological interventions could effectively target.  
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In order to address the related issue of the variance in how rumination is defined in rumination 
studies to date, this review will also look at the specific mechanisms authors focussed on when 
they refer to rumination and whether they are differentially related to the relevant cognitive 
processes being studied. 
 
Research Questions 
For these reasons, the current review aims to address the following questions:  
1) Is rumination related to cognitive biases and deficits in depression? 
2) What is the nature of these relations as indicated by existing findings? 
 
METHODOLOGY AND INCLUSION CRITERIA 
 
 
Search Strategies 
The studies included in the reviews were identified through searches on a number of online 
databases with systematic search strategies, as well as from the reference lists of relevant 
review and empirical research papers. 
Searches were conducted separately on the PsycINFO, Medline, and Web of Science 
databases, limiting results to English language, peer-reviewed journal articles published from 
the beginning of 1990 to 2011.  
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A number of initial scoping searches using a wide variety of search terms were carried out in an 
attempt to identify all the studies that examined cognitive processes suggested to associate with 
rumination in depression. Keyword searches using the search terms combination depression 
and rumination yielded a total of 1262 results. Additional terms dysphoria, affective disorder and 
mood disorder were used in conjunction with depression, and brooding, repetitive, and reflection 
with rumination in further search runs in order to allow for variations in keywords.  
To search for studies which addressed specific cognitive processes or mechanisms related to 
rumination in depression, a search run using the terms cognition or cognitive and depression 
and rumination was conducted and yielded 790 results. As a wide range of cognitive processes 
were covered in the literature, and the naming for them by different authors was not always 
consistent, supplementary terms were required to broaden the search criteria to cover all 
studies that addressed the relevant cognitive processes. For a comprehensive investigation of 
the cognitive processes that were identified to be associated with rumination in depression, and 
hence suitable search terms, the author surveyed four relevant literature review articles 
(Matthews & McLeod, 2005; Baune, Miller, McAfoose, Johnson, Quirk & Mitchellm, 2010; 
Joormann & D‘Avanzato, 2010; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010). Subsequently, the terms attention, 
memory, executive, inhibit*, beliefs, thought, problem, solving and bias were added to the 
search terms. In the final search run, the key terms Depress* or dysphori* or mood* or affect* 
AND Ruminat* or repetitive or brooding* or reflection* AND Cognit* or attention*or memor* or 
executive* or inhibit* or bias were used. 
 
Truncated terms were used to allow for variation in keywords, such as rumination and 
ruminative, dysphoria or dysphoric. The above search generated 129 results. These results 
were scanned by their titles for relevance, and then by their abstracts to determine whether they 
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met the inclusion criteria. A total of 83 studies were chosen for detailed further appraisal against 
the inclusion criteria.  
 
Inclusion Criteria 
In addition to the above mentioned search limits, further search criteria were used to restrict the 
search outcomes to: 
1) Articles that reported case-control empirical or quantitative studies 
2) Studies that used adult participants who met the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for major 
depressive disorder (MDD)  
3) Studies that addressed at least one specifically defined cognitive process, which was 
hypothesised to be associated with rumination in depression 
4) Studies that reported the outcomes of one or more quantitative measures of the 
cognitive process(es) addressed. 
Moreover, studies which only examined mindfulness, both as a cognitive style or a practice, 
were excluded because of a lack of valid and reliable measurement of this construct. Out of the 
83 of papers identified for detailed appraisal based on the above considerations, 27 of them 
were selected to be included in the systematic review. 
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Results 
 
Studies included in the review 
A total of 25 studies were included in the current review. 27 studies were initially found using the 
above search parameters, of which two were excluded because they lacked a specific measure 
for rumination or the cognitive processes they examined (Yook, Kim, Suh & Lee, 2010; 
Radenborgh, Jong-Meyer & Huffmeier, 2010).   
The 25 reviewed studies were categorised according to the cognitive processes they explored in 
relation to depressive rumination. The following groups were identified: studies exploring 
reduced specificity in memory (n=5) and memory biases (n=1); studies looking at cognitive or 
thinking biases (n=6) and attentional biases (n=2); studies investigating deficits in inhibition 
(n=5); impairment in allocation of general cognitive resources (n=1) and thought control (n=2); 
and finally studies examining deficits in problem solving (n=3). Details of the studies are 
summarised in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Studies investigating the associations of rumination with biases and deficits in cognitive processes in people with depression 
 
Raes et al. 
(2006b) 
MDD, N=28 Reduced autobiographical 
memory specificity 
Rumination on 
Sadness Scale 
Reduced autobiographical memory specificity predicted poor 
outcome of depression. This prediction was found to be 
mediated by rumination. 
 
Study Sample Cognitive process(es) 
investigated 
Measure(s) of 
rumination 
Main findings 
 
Watkins, 
Teasdale & 
Williams (2000) 
 
Depressed (N=48, 
54% MDD; 75% 
past MDD; 17% 
dysthmia) 
 
Overgeneral 
autobiographical memory  
 
n/a Rumination induction moderately increased, while distraction 
induction significantly decreased categorical memory recalled by 
depressed participants. 
Watkins & 
Teasdale 
(2001) 
MDD, N=36 Self-focus, analytical thinking 
and overgeneral 
autobiographical memory 
n/a Induction of analytical thinking rather than self-focus significantly 
increased overgeneral memory.Induction of self-focussed 
thinking affected moods. 
 
Raes et al. 
(2005) 
MDD, N=24 Reduced specificity of (or 
overgeneral) 
autobiographical memory 
and social problem solving 
deficits 
RRS;  
Rumination on 
Sadness Scale 
(RSS) (Conway, 
Csank, Holm, & 
Blake, 2000) 
Trait-rumination, ineffective problem-solving and reduced 
memory specificity were significantly associated.  
Regression analyses showed that reduced memory specificity 
mediated the association between rumination and problem-
solving effectiveness. 
 
Raes et al. 
(2006a) 
MDD, N=26 Overgeneral  
autobiographical memory,  
working memory, semantic 
memory, verbal learning, 
delayed verbal recall, 
recognition memory, and 
source memory 
RRS; Rumination 
on Sadness Scale 
(RSS)  
Rumination was found to be related to both overgeneral 
autobiographical memory and poor source memory. 
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Study Sample Cognitive process(es) 
investigated 
Measure(s) of 
rumination 
Main findings 
 
Joorman, 
Dkane & Gotlib 
(2006) 
 
MDD, N=64 
Formerly 
depressed, N=36 
Social phobia, N=20 
Never disordered, 
N=91 
 
Memory and attentional 
biases  
 
 
RRS (brooding and 
reflection 
subscales) (Treynor 
et al., 2003) 
 
Brooding and reflection were differentially correlated to biased 
recalls of words associated with sadness and social threats. 
These correlations lost significance when depressive symptoms 
were partialled out.The correlation between brooding and 
attentional bias for sad faces, however, remained significant 
even when current depressive symptoms were taken into 
account. 
 
Spasojevic & 
Alloy (2001) 
 
Initially non-
depressed students, 
N=137 
 
Negative cognitive styles 
 
RRS 
 
Longitudinal study found that an initial association between trait-
rumination and negative cognitive styles is significantly related to 
the number of subsequent depressive episodes in the following 
2.5 years. Further analysis showed that trait-rumination mediated 
the relation between negative cognitive styles and prognosis of 
depression. 
Robinson & 
Alloy (2003) 
Initially non-
depressed students, 
N=148 
Negative cognitive styles RRS;  
The Stress-
Reactive 
Rumination Scale 
(SRRS; Alloy et al., 
2000; 
Robinson,1997) 
Stress-reactive rumination (measured by the SRRS), but not 
symptom-focussed rumination (measured by RRS), interacted 
with negative cognitive styles to predict frequency and duration 
of depressive episodes in the subsequent 2.5 years. 
Lam, Checkley 
& Sham (2003) 
MDD, N=109 Hopelessness, biased 
attributional styles, and 
maladaptive attitudes 
RRS Trait-rumination is associated to levels of Hopelessness, biased 
attributional styles, and maladaptive attitudes. However it did not 
predict, in retrospect, the number of past depressive episodes. 
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Study Sample Cognitive process(es) 
investigated 
Measure(s) of 
rumination 
Main findings 
 
Rimes & 
Watkins (2005) 
 
MDD, N=30  
Healthy controls, 
N=30  
 
Analytical and evaluative 
self-focussed ruminative 
thinking;  Global negative 
self-judgements 
 
RRS 
 
In depressed participants, induction of the analytical self-focus 
condition increased ratings of the self as worthless and 
incompetent, whereas the experiential self-focus induction 
resulted in no signiﬁcant change in such judgements. 
Lo, Ho & Hollon 
(2008) 
Depressed (MDD, 
N=35; Dysthmia, 
N=3) 
Healthy controls 
(college students, 
N=115) 
Brooding, reflection, and 
negative cognitive styles 
RRS (brooding and 
reflection 
subscales) (Treynor 
et al., 2003) 
Brooding , not reﬂection, mediates the relationship between 
negative cognitive styles and depression. 
Lavender & 
Watkins (2004) 
Depressed (current 
major depressive 
episode), N=30 
Non-depressed, 
N=15 
Biases in future thinking n/a In the depressed group, rumination induction increased both 
negative and positive future thinking, although the effect was 
only significant for negative future thinking once baseline levels 
of hopelessness were controlled for. 
Donaldson, 
Lam & 
Matthews 
(2007) 
MDD, N=36 
Non-depressed, 
N=36 
Attentional bias towards 
emotionally-valenced words 
RRS Results showed that depression is associated with an attentional 
bias towards negative information. This bias is stronger in 
individuals who underwent rumination induction. 
Raes, Hermans 
& Williams 
(2007) 
MDD, N=26 Negative bias in perception 
of emotional facial 
expressions 
RRS Rumination was positively related to a negative bias in the 
judgment of facial expressions, even after controlling for 
dysfunctional attitudes and depressive symptoms. 
Watkins & 
Brown (2002) 
Depression, N=14 
Non-depressed 
controls, N=14 
Deficit in inhibitory executive 
control 
n/a Rumination induction produced a significant increase in both 
ruminations and a failure of inhibitory executive control (as 
indicated by a tendency towards stereotyped counting responses 
to a number generation task) in depressed patients.  
Lau, 
Christensen, 
Hawley, Gemar 
& Segal (2007) 
MDD, N=43 
Anxious, non-
depressed, N=32 
Healthy controls, 
N=36 
Inhibitory deﬁcit for negative 
information; Negative 
thinking 
RRS  Participants with MDD demonstrated impairments in reading 
stories embedded with distracter words. The impairment was 
most pronounced for negatively valenced adjectives, relative to 
both control groups. These impairments correlated with self-
report measures of negative thinking and rumination. 
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Study Sample Cognitive process(es) 
investigated 
Measure(s) of 
rumination 
Main findings 
 
Joorman & 
Gotlib (2010) 
 
 
 
MDD, 
N=22;Remitted 
major depression, 
N= 47 
Healthy controls, 
N=32 
 
Inhibitory deficit in the 
processing of negative 
material 
 
RRS (brooding and 
reflection 
subscales) (Treynor 
et al., 2003) 
 
In depressed patients, inhibitory deficit was positively associated 
with brooding, but negatively associated with reflection, after 
depression severity was controlled for. Neither inhibitory deficits 
nor any relations between inhibition and rumination were found in 
the formerly depressed group. 
 
 
Goeleven, de 
Raedt, Baert & 
Koster (2006) 
MDD (inpatients, 
N=20); 
Formerly 
depressed, N=20; 
Healthy controls, 
N=20 
Deficient inhibition of 
emotional information 
RRS Compared to never-depressed controls, depressed patients 
showed a specific failure to inhibit negative information, whereas 
inhibition function for positive material was unaffected. Formerly 
depressed individuals demonstrated impaired inhibition of 
negative and positive information. Rumination predicted 
inhibitory deficit of negative information, but did not do so over 
and above depressive symptoms. 
 
Joormann & 
Gotlib (2008) 
MDD, N=23; 
Healthy controls, 
N=40 
Impairment in updating of 
working memory contents 
RRS Compared to controls, depressed participants were shown to 
have experienced greater intrusion by negative words they were 
previously presented and asked to treat as ‗irrelevant‘. This 
indicates that depression is associated with difficulties removing 
irrelevant negative material from working memory. The intrusion 
effects for negative words were correlated with self-reported 
rumination. 
Levens, 
Muhtadie & 
Gotlib (2009) 
MDD, N=24; 
Never-depressed, 
N=24 
Impaired allocation of 
general cognitive resource  
RRS (brooding and 
reflection 
subscales) (Treynor 
et al., 2003) 
Depressed participants performed worse than non-depressed 
participants in the high-interference, but not the low-interference, 
condition in the dual-task experimental paradigm. This indicates 
that depressed participants experienced deficit in the controlled 
allocation of resources to resolve dual-task interference. The 
degree to which depressed participants were impaired in the 
high-interference condition was significantly correlated with 
rumination. 
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Study Sample Cognitive process(es) 
investigated 
Measure(s) of 
rumination 
Main findings 
 
Watkins & 
Moulds (2009) 
 
MDD, N=52; 
Recovered 
depressed, N=36 
Never depressed, 
N=49 
 
Thought Control Strategies 
(distraction, social control, 
worry,self-punishment and 
reappraisal); 
Thought suppression 
 
RRS brooding and 
reflection 
subscales) (Treynor 
et al., 2003) 
 
Rumination was significantly correlated with worry and thought 
intrusions; and moderately correlated with thought suppression, 
distraction and self-punishment. Regression analysis suggested 
that rumination predicts thought suppression. 
 
Szasz (2009) MDD, N=46 Thought suppression RRS Both thought suppression and depressive rumination are related 
to depression. The impact of thought suppression on depression 
is completely mediated by depressive rumination.  
Watkins & 
Baracaia (2002) 
MDD, N=32 
Recovered 
depressed, N=26 
Never depressed, 
N=26 
Social problem-solving 
deficits 
RRS Relative to never-depressed participants, depressed and 
formerly depressed patients showed significantly greater 
impairments in their problem-solving after receiving state-
oriented induction. These impairments were improved by a 
process-focussed thinking procedure.  
Watkins & 
Moulds (2005) 
MDD, N=40 
Non-depressed, 
N=40 
Abstract self-focus and 
concrete self-focus 
rumination;  
 
Problem-solving 
n/a Compared to abstract self-focus, the concrete self-focus 
induction procedure improved social problem-solving in 
depressed patients.  
Donaldson & 
Lam (2004) 
Depressed (current 
major depressive 
episode), N=36 
Non-depressed, 
N=26 
Social problem-solving RRS Depressed patients with higher levels of trait-rumination reported 
poorer mood and showed less effective problem- solving. 
Depressed patients who underwent a rumination induction 
procedure experienced a deterioration in their mood and gave 
poorer problem solutions. Rumination induction did not have an 
impact on mood or problem-solving in control participants 
Note. MDD = Major depressive disorder; RRS= The ruminative responses scale, a subscale of the Response style questionnaire 
(RSQ) (Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1991); N stands for sample size
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Study Characteristics 
Of the 25 studies reviewed, 8 employed experimental designs to manipulate participants‘ 
ruminative states and the other 17used correlational designs to study the relation of rumination 
and other cognitive processes. All but three longitudinal studies (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001; 
Robinson & Alloy, 2003; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyer & Eelen, 2006) used a cross-sectional 
design. Excepting the studies by Spasojevic and Alloy (2001) and Robinson and Alloy (2003), 
who included initially healthy participants at the outset of their longitudinal study, all studies 
included participants with depression as a part of their sample. Depressed participants in all 
except for one study (Watkins & Brown, 2002) were determined as meeting the DSM-IV criteria 
for MDD or a current major depressive episode through SCID interviews by qualified clinicians. 
Studies included a mixed proportion of inpatients, outpatients, and volunteers. 15 out of the 25 
reviewed studies had a healthy control group. Of these, 5 included an experimental group of 
participants who were formerly depressed, and 2 included other comparison groups consisting 
of individuals with other affective disorders (see Table 1).  
In terms of measures for rumination, 20 out of the 25 reviewed studies used a valid 
measurement of trait rumination. 19 of these studies used the RRS from the RSQ (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), of which 5 separately analysed scores from its brooding and 
reflection subscales. 3 used the rumination on sadness scale (RSS) (Conway, Csank, Holm & 
Blake, 2000) and 1 adopted the stress-reactive rumination scale (SRRS) (Alloy et al., 2000). In 
the studies that did not include a trait-rumination measure, state-rumination was induced by 
experimental manipulations and examined as independent variables. 12 studies regarded and 
measured rumination only as conceptualised by the Response Style Theory (i.e. self-focussed, 
repetitive thinking in response to depressive symptoms). 5 considered the brooding and 
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reflection subcomponents, 2 examined the self-focussed analytical versus self-focussed 
experiential thinking, and 1 studied abstract versus concrete self-focussed rumination.  
 
Over-generalised memory and memory biases 
A substantial body of evidence has shown that depressed individuals are characterised by 
memory biases, such as a higher accessibility to negative memory (see Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005), and a reduced specificity of memory contents (see William et al., 2007). The latter, 
overgeneral memories, was often associated with rumination (e.g. Kao, Dritschel, Astell, 2006; 
Watkins, Williams & Hermans, 2008; Debeer, Hermans & Raes, 2009). However, to date only 5 
studies including participants with current depression were identified. 
 
Preliminary evidence for the effect of rumination on categorical (or overgeneral) memory came 
from Watkins, Teasdale and Williams‘s (2000) findings. The authors randomly assigned their 
depressed/dysphoric participants (n=42) into two groups receiving inductions using either a 
rumination or distraction induction task. The rumination task was designed by Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Marrow (1993), in order to increase the degree of self- and symptom-focus in a person‘s 
thinking. The overgeneral memory was measured by the autobiographical memory task (AMT), 
a test designed by Williams (1995) in which participants were instructed to recall memories 
prompted by emotionally positive, negative and neutral cue words. Specificities of these 
memories were then subject to independent ratings. The results showed that rumination 
moderately increased the amount of categorical memory recalled, while distraction significantly 
reduced that, irrespective of their mood change.  
A caveat for this study is that the authors did not separately examine the clinically depressed 
and dysphoric participants, or include a healthy control group. It is therefore unclear if the main 
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effects of rumination are specifically related to depression. Furthermore, the authors analysed 
the recalled memories from the AMT across the three groups of emotionally varied cue words 
together. Given the previous findings which suggested that dysphoric individuals preferentially 
process negative information (Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Matthews, 1997), separate analyses 
might yield a larger effect of rumination on memory with emotional contents.  
The same authors conducted a follow-up study, which compared the effects of two different 
mechanisms, self-focus and analytical thinking, which might underline the effect of rumination 
reported in their previous findings (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). The authors randomly assigned 
their depressed participants (n=36) into four equal groups. Each group received an 
experimental induction characterised by one of the four combinations of high or low self-focus, 
and high or low self-analytical thinking. They compared the three groups for their mood changes 
as well as performance in the AMT following the inductions. They found that whereas only high 
self-focus increased low mood, only a high self-analytical thinking style increased overgeneral 
memory in their participants, without showing any effect of interaction of the two processes. 
Thus the results suggested a double dissociation between the self-focus and analytical aspects 
of rumination, with the latter alone affecting memory in depressed individuals.  
As in their previous study, this study did not include a non-depressed control group. Also worth 
noting is that neither of these studies accounted for the variations in the participants‘ pre-
induction tendency to rumination, such as by taking trait-rumination measures. Because of this 
the variation in participants‘ predisposition to rumination may potentially have confounded the 
effects of the induction procedures.  
More recently, Raes and his colleagues conducted three studies which have revealed more 
details regarding the relations between overgeneral autobiographical memory and rumination in 
depression. First, Raes, Hermans, Williams, Demytternaere, Sabbe, Pieters and Eelen (2005) 
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examined the role of overgeneral memory in the well-demonstrated relationships between 
rumination and social problem-solving deficits in depression (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). Using a correlational design, the authors 
compared their depressed participants‘ (n=24) tendency to ruminate, memory specificity using a 
recall task (AMT), and their social problem-solving skills. The tests found memory specificity to 
be significantly related to both problem-solving skills and rumination, and reported that the 
former relations remained significant even after they controlled for the levels of rumination and 
working memory capacity. Further analysis showed that reduced memory specificity mediates 
the relation between rumination and lowered social problem-solving skills in people with 
depression. Together they suggest the possibility that rumination affects problem-solving skills 
in depression partly through its effects on autobiographical rather than working memory. 
However, the ability to draw such a depression-specific and causal conclusion was limited by 
the lack of a non-depressed control group and the correlational nature of the study, respectively.  
To explore the relation between overgeneral autobiographical memory and other areas of 
memory functioning in depression, Raes et al. (2006) assessed various memory performances 
of depressed patients (n=26). They also reported measures of trait-rumination in the study. 
Confirming earlier findings, trait rumination was positively related to the level of overgeneral 
memory. Rumination was also found to be correlated with reduced working memory and poor 
source memory (the recognition of long-term episodic memory), all irrespective of the variations 
in depressive symptoms. To test rumination‘s role in the hypothesis that recalling specific 
memory required working memory capacity (Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the authors 
tested its relation with overgeneral memory again, after controlling for the working memory 
scores. The results suggested a direct relation between trait-rumination and overgeneral 
autobiographical memory. This study used a correlational design, which, as mentioned above, 
precludes its results from showing the directions of the reported relations. In addition, this study 
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used the Letter-Number Sequencing task (LNS), which might not be the most appropriate test of 
working memory functioning associated with the retrieval of autobiographical memory. An 
experimental design using a dual-task paradigm might be preferable in future studies of the 
specific role of working memory in the relations between rumination and autobiographical 
memory. 
Finally, Raes, Herman, Williams, Beyer and Eelen (2006) sought to verify previous evidence 
which showed reduced memory specificity as a predictor of depression (Dalgleish et al, 2001; 
Peeters et al., 2002), and whether this can be explained by rumination. 28 inpatients with 
depression were measured for their depressive symptoms and memory specificity (using the 
AMT) across a 7 month period. Subsequent regression analysis showed that reduced 
autobiographical memory specificity recalled at emotionally negative cue words predicted 
significantly poorer outcomes in depression. However, the significance disappeared when the 
authors factored in the participants‘ levels of trait-rumination. This indicated that rumination at 
least partially mediated the relationship between reduced memory specificity and depressive 
symptoms. However, as the authors acknowledged, this study had a small sample size, which 
might affect the robustness of the evidence by limiting the statistical power of the analyses. 
Furthermore, although the authors adopted a prospective design, which is apt to provide 
evidence for a mediational relationship, future studies may benefit from also assessing the 
relations between reduced memory specificity and rumination to more strongly demonstrate the 
mediating role of rumination. 
With regard to the depressive bias in memory content, only Joormann, Dkane and Gotlib (2006) 
have so far explored how it relates to rumination as a part of their study. In comparison with 
formerly depressed and socially phobic patients, as well as healthy controls, the authors 
measured the brooding and reflection levels of their depressed participants (n=64) and explored 
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their corresponding relations to bias in a self-referential encoding recall task. It required the 
participants to recall emotional words they previously decided to be self-referential. Brooding, 
but not reflection, was positively correlated to sad and socially threatening words, but negatively 
to happy words. This was consistent with earlier reports of negative memory biases with 
rumination (e.g. Matt, Vazque & Campbell, 1992; Ridout et al., 2003). However, this relation 
disappeared when the authors controlled for the depressive symptoms of the participants, 
suggesting that the memory bias was an artefact of the depressive symptoms, rather than the 
consequence of rumination per se. As this is the only study yet to look at this relation in the 
context of current depression, further studies will be required to establish this finding. This study 
suffers the common limitations of a correlational study. One may also query the generalisability 
of this finding to other aspects of memory recall, such as autobiographical memory, due to the 
specificity of single-word recall.  
Collectively, these studies presented evidence which support a close relation between trait-
rumination and overgeneral recall of autobiographical memory. Rumination, as a temporary 
state of highly self-focussed and analytical thinking, was also shown to reduce memory 
specificity for people with depression. Evidence is sparse and less consistent with other aspects 
of memory functioning. While some data suggested working memory to be related, other 
common depressive cognitions such as negative bias in encoding and recall did not seem to 
have a direct relation with rumination. Lastly,  two different formulations of rumination subtypes 
(i.e. high-low self-analytic thinking; brooding and reflection) were adopted by the different 
research groups, and both seem to be developing in terms of evidence which explains their 
underlying mechanisms. 
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Thinking Biases 
Clinical evidence has shown that depression is characterised by negative biases in 
interpretation and appraisal (e.g. Butler & Mathews, 1983; Alloy et al., 2000; Fresco, Alloy & 
Reilly-Harrington, 2006), although this has not always found support in empirical studies 
(Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Bisson & Seara, 2007). More recent studies have demonstrated 
that these negative biases are related to higher rumination (Robinson & Alloy, 2003; Watkins, 
2004), and that their interactions with rumination predict depressive symptoms (Cielas & 
Roberts, 2007). One possible explanation is that thinking biases tend to create rigid, automatic 
and negative thought responses to dysphoria, which interacts with the heightened tendency to 
ruminate to create a cognitive-affective vicious cycle that exacerbates depressive symptoms 
(Teasdale, 1999; Siemer & Reisenzein, 2007). Six studies that examined these effects in 
depressed patients have been identified.  
Early support for the role of rumination came from the findings of two longitudinal studies that 
looked at the effects of rumination and negative cognitive styles on the development of 
depressive symptoms over time. Spasojevic and Alloy (2001) followed 137 originally non-
depressed college students for 2.5 years and found that an initial association between the 
tendency of responding to low mood with rumination and strong negative cognitive styles as 
measured by the Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ) was significantly related to their number 
of depressive episodes over the tested period. Further mediational analyses reported that 
rumination explained the association between negative cognitive biases and the frequencies of 
major depressive episodes.  
From the same study project, Robinson and Alloy (2003) extended the above findings by 
distinguishing trait self-focussed rumination as conceptualised by the RST and a more specific 
tendency to ruminate on self-referential thoughts following stressful events (or stress-reactive 
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rumination, SRR) (Alloy et al., 2000). They monitored the development of depressive symptoms 
in 148 depressed patients for 2.5 years, and reported that participants who showed higher initial 
negative cognitive styles (on CSQ) and SRR had the highest incidence and duration of major 
depressive episodes. When controlled for the main effects of SRR and negative cognitive styles 
alone, they found that the interaction between these two variables significantly predicted later 
depressive episodes. This finding was later supported by a study which showed that rumination 
predicts changes in depression more strongly among individuals with high levels of negative 
cognition (Cielas & Roberts, 2007). Interestingly, they did not find the same interaction effect for 
ruminative responses to depressive symptoms as measured by the full RRS. They concluded 
that although rumination in response to depressed affect was related to the maintenance of 
depression, there was a unique component of SRR that contributed to the onset and 
persistence of depressive episodes.  
As part of their study, Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, and Sham (2003) investigated the 
associations of rumination scores on the RRS to hopelessness, biased attributional style (e.g. a 
global, internal and stable interpretation of negative events), maladaptive attitudes, and the 
numbers of past depressive episodes in 109 outpatients with depression. Regression analyses 
of their data suggested that rumination predicted all factors except for the retrospective lifetime 
episodes of depression, after controlling for the effects of gender and depressive symptoms.  
The latter is consistent with the findings of Robinson and Alloy (2003) which suggested that 
although rumination as formulated by the RST might maintain depressive symptoms, it does not 
predict the onset or the number of past depressive episodes. Studies with a prospective design 
may serve as a next step to verify the predictive role of the different subtypes of rumination. It is 
also unclear if the findings were specific to depressed patients, as the study did not include any 
control study group. 
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An empirical study carried out by Rimes and Watkins (2005) extended these findings. 
Comparing depressed patients (n=30) with non-depressed controls (n=30), they measured the 
effect of analytical self-focus, a subcomponent of rumination, on their self-reported levels of 
negative self-judgements. Participants reported for their worthlessness, lovability, competence 
and acceptability, before and after they undertook either a self-focussed analytical thinking or an 
experiential self-focussed induction procedure. The results showed that, after controlling for 
depressed moods, analytical self-focus significantly caused increases in negative self-
judgement, especially worthlessness and incompetence, in depressed patients alone. Hence 
they suggested a specific and causal effect of self-focussed analytical thinking on cognitive 
biases in depression. In the light of these findings, it might be inferred that rumination increases 
risk of future depression partly through increasing maladaptive cognitive biases.  However, 
along with Lam et al.(2003) study, it relied exclusively on self-report measures. Therefore, at 
least some of their results may be affected by response biases and demand effects. 
Further evidence for the effect of rumination on depressive cognitions was reported by Lo, Ho 
and Hollon (2008). They contrasted the associations of brooding and reflection (subscales of 
RRS) separately with negative cognitive styles (on ASQ) between depressed patients (n=38) 
and healthy college students (n=115). Brooding, but not reflection, mediated the association 
between negative cognitive styles and depressive symptoms in both groups.  These results 
strengthened the differentiation between brooding and reflection as two subtypes of rumination 
as postulated by Treynor et al. (2003). Compared with the findings of Rimes and Watkins (2005), 
the results may also suggest that brooding is a more general process than self-analytical 
thinking, as it seems to explain the effects of unhelpful cognitions in both depressed and non-
depressed individuals. This study did not document any formal diagnostic procedure, which 
needs to be considered before generalising its results to clinical populations. It also had a 
relatively small sample size for a formal mediational analysis, which might limit the statistical 
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power of the test.  Future studies aiming to verify these findings may consider using a 
prospective or empirical design in order to better elucidate the mediating role of brooding. 
Hopelessness is a hallmark symptom of depression (Abraham, Alloy & Metalsky, 1989). A 
studyby Lavender and Watkins (2004) investigated the effect of rumination on depressed 
patients‘ (n=30)biases in future thinking . Using a future thinking task, they compared depressed 
patients with healthy controls (n=30) in terms of their abilities to imagine positive and negative 
events, after either a rumination or distraction induction. Rumination increased the level of 
negative future thinking only in depressed patients. This suggested that rumination may at least 
partially account for the experience of hopelessness in depression. The study‘s  strength is that 
the authors measured the verbal fluency of all participants, hence controlling for the variation of 
the thought-generation abilities in the sample during the experiment; the control participants 
were also matched for age, IQ and gender. However, although the authors measured the mood 
changes before and after the induction tasks, they did not control for them in their analyses. 
Therefore, the changes in the participants‘ future thinking might also be explained by the 
changes in their mood-states. 
 
Attentional Biases 
Although impairments of attentional control were frequently referred to in studies of rumination 
and cognitive dysfunction, such as inhibitory deficit and set-shifting (e.g. Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), they were not tested directly in empirical studies. 
On the other hand, more research was focussed on the related area of attentional bias. 
Although most past evidence showed an absence of biased attention in depression, recent 
empirical studies had shown a few exceptions, for example, perceptual biases of facial 
expression (e.g. Carton et al., 1999); biases for stimuli presented for long post-conscious 
27 
 
duration in attention tasks were reported of people with dysphoria (e.g. Mogg, Bradley & 
Williams, 1995; Mathews, Ridgeway & Williamson, 1996). A review of the literature has yielded 
two studies which investigated rumination and attention in people with depression. This small 
number perhaps reflects the overall lack of research on this subject. 
As the first study which empirically explored the relations between attention and rumination in 
depression, Donaldson, Lam and Mathews (2007) tested the effect of rumination and distraction 
induction on attentional bias for emotional materials in patients diagnosed with MDD (n=36) and 
healthy controls (n=36). Participants‘ levels of trait rumination were also assessed. Attentional 
bias was measured by a dot probe task, in which participants were presented pairs of words 
(neutral and negative) for either 500ms or 1000ms, and asked to respond to dot stimuli that 
replaced either of the words.  A bias is indicated by quicker responses to dots that replaced 
negative rather than neutral words. The results reported that depressed patients demonstrated 
biased attention towards negative information only when stimuli were presented for a longer 
post-conscious duration, i.e. 1000ms. Although the bias was not influenced by rumination or 
distraction inductions, it was significantly related to trait-rumination.  
One possible explanation is that rumination induction might not be a good enough analogue of 
naturally occurring rumination. Since this is the first experiment which tested the effect of 
rumination on attention, future research may use a longer, or a different, induction procedure to 
replicate this finding. Besides, given the close relations of attentional control with different 
cognitive processes, it is possible that the effect shown in this study might not be a specific one. 
This may be examined by including measurement of relevant cognitive processes in future 
studies. 
Raes, Hermans and Williams (2006) examined the association between rumination and 
perception of emotional facial expressions, another attentional bias previously reported in 
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depression. For this purpose they measured 26 depressed patients for their tendency to see 
negative emotions in facial expression (using the Perception of Facial Expressions 
Questionnaire, PFEQ) and their trait-rumination using the RRS. They found that rumination was 
significantly related to the level of negative expression perceived by the participants, even after 
their maladaptive thinking patterns, and their depressive and anxiety symptoms were controlled 
for.  
Finally, as part of the study conducted by Joormann, Dkane and Gotlib (2006), 64 depressed 
participants undertook a dot-probe task in which they were asked to look at a series of pictures 
showing emotional facial expression. Analyses of the experiment‘s results suggested that 
depressed individuals had a significant attentional bias towards sad faces. This bias was found 
to be related to their brooding scores on the RRS, but not their reflection scale scores, even 
when the results took into account their initial depressive symptoms. 
 
Inhibition Deficits  
Major depression has been associated with deficits in executive function. Specific areas of 
impairments included the inhibition of irrelevant materials in working memory, attentional set-
shifting, and problem-solving (see Joormann, 2005; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Although 
executive dysfunction may be a primary effect of depression, research evidence has 
demonstrated that it may also result from interference by rumination.  
Watkins and Brown (2002) used a random number generation task to test capacities to inhibit 
habitual counting in depressed (n=14) and non-depressed participants (n=14) after they 
received either a rumination or distraction induction. They demonstrated that depressed 
participants who were induced to ruminate had a significantly stronger tendency to count 
29 
 
habitually than the non-depressed participants, indicating a lower ability to inhibit pre-potent and 
irrelevant responses. On the other hand, depressed participants who undertook distraction 
induction achieved on par with the non-depressed participants in the task. For this reason, the 
authors concluded that inhibitory deficits in depressed patients resulted from the interference of 
rumination–which takes up the cognitive resources required for the effective inhibition of 
irrelevant information from the working memory–rather than a fundamental impairment in 
executive functioning.  
One of this study‘s strengths is that it examined the participants‘ ruminative states during the 
experimental tasks; this allowed it to make conclusions about the disruption of ruminative 
thinking on these tasks due to its competition for cognitive resources. However, the authors did 
not establish a baseline performance for the random number generation task, and therefore 
could not control for the effects of individual variability in the participants‘ original inhibition 
capacities.   
Adding to previous findings, Lau, Christensen, Hawley, Gemar and Segal (2007) looked at the 
inhibitory deficits of emotional materials in depression. They compared depressed outpatients 
(n=43) with both non-depressed anxious (n=32) and healthy (n=36) volunteers for levels of trait-
rumination, negative thinking, and cognitive inhibition. To assess cognitive inhibition, 
participants were asked to read out loud stories embedded with distractors made up of positive, 
neutral or negative words. The time participants took to read through the stories was taken to 
reflect their abilities to inhibit the processing of emotional thoughts triggered by the distractors. 
Depressed patients performed significantly slower on the tasks with negative distractor words, 
but similarly to the other two groups on the tasks with positive and neutral words, indicating a 
specific deficit of inhibition of negative materials.  Furthermore, regression analyses showed that 
this was also positively correlated to and predicted the frequency of negative thinking and 
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rumination.  Therefore, as well as showing a valence-specific inhibition deficit in depressed 
individuals, these results also suggested that people with depression may have a weakened 
ability to inhibit the activation of repetitive negative thoughts. However the correlational analysis 
used by this study does not allow it to conclude whether the inhibitory deficit in depression is a 
causal risk factor for rumination. 
Further evidence of the link between rumination and dysfunctional inhibition of negative 
information was demonstrated in a study by Joormann and Gotlib (2010). Using a negative 
priming task with emotional word stimuli, they reported a reduced ability to inhibit negative 
words that participants had been asked to ignore (or reduced negative priming effect) by 
depressed patients (n=22), compared to remitted (n=47) and never depressed participants 
(n=32).  They also assessed rumination using the RRS, and compared brooding and reflection 
subscale scores with the outcomes of negative priming of different groups. They found that in 
depressed patients, inhibitory deficit was positively associated with brooding, but negatively 
associated with reflection, after depression severity was controlled for. This provided evidence 
for a dissociation between the two subtypes of rumination in relation to inhibitory deficits. It was 
worth noting that neither inhibitory deficits nor any relations between inhibition and rumination 
were found in the formerly depressed group, suggesting that inhibitory deficits may remit with 
other depressive symptoms in recovery. Instead its severity seemed to vary with the use of 
adaptive or maladaptive repetitive thinking. 
Using a negative priming task with emotional faces as stimuli, Goeleven, de Raedt, Baert and 
Koster (2006) reported apparently opposite results. They compared the response times of 20 
depressed inpatients, 20 formerly depressed and 20 non-depressed controls, to happy, neutral 
and negative faces they were earlier instructed to ignore. Although the depressed participants 
showed the predicted inhibitory deficit (or lower negative priming effect) for sad faces, no 
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relation was reported between that and rumination. A possible explanation for this finding may 
lie in the use of visual stimuli (emotional faces) in this study, which may not have a direct 
relation with verbal thinking, in which rumination is conducted. Moreover, this study did not 
examine separately the relation of inhibition with reflection and brooding, which are both parts of 
the rumination response scale (RRS). As reflection and brooding were shown to have opposite 
associations to depressive cognitions in previous research, analysis using the combined score 
may mask more specific relations between a subtype of rumination and inhibition.  
Most studies on inhibitory deficit in depression so far have investigated the impairment in 
controlling access of irrelevant information to working memory, such as studies using the 
negative priming paradigm. However, a small but growing literature has explored other 
hypotheses of the mechanisms underlying inhibitory deficits.  
Joormann and Gotlib (2008) looked at inhibitory dysfunction at a relatively later stage of 
information processing, namely the mechanism of removing irrelevant materials to update 
cognitions in working memory, and its relation to rumination. They used a recognition task 
where participants were instructed to respond according to emotional word stimuli which were 
either shown earlier to them as ‗relevant‘ or ‗irrelevant‘, or were completely new. Then they 
compared participants‘ response latencies for the irrelevant words and new words, as the index 
of the interference of irrelevant (and supposedly ignored) emotional words on their working 
memory functions. It was found that participants diagnosed with MDD were significantly slower 
in response to the ‗irrelevant‘, negative words than healthy controls. All their performances were 
otherwise comparable to the controls, which suggested that depressed patients were more 
susceptible to the residual activation of cognitions in working memory that were declared to be 
no longer relevant, and that there is a bias in this effect for negative materials. In addition, this 
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effect was found to be correlated with rumination as a response style in depressed patients, 
after their depressive symptoms were controlled for.  
It was noted that this study yielded positive relations of brooding as well as reflection with 
increased interference of irrelevant information to working memory in depressed patients. This 
suggested that interference of irrelevant materials on working memory is related to a higher 
tendency of general repetitive thinking rather than just maladaptive pondering. Also, this study 
included a sub-group of healthy controls which undertook a sad mood induction. As they did not 
demonstrate any impairment in their responses to irrelevant negative words, the effect shown in 
the depressed patient group could not be explained by low mood alone. However, it is unclear if 
an induced negative mood state is comparable to negative mood in major depression; therefore 
mood as an explanation for the differences shown between groups cannot be completely ruled 
out. 
 
Impairment in Allocation of General Cognitive Resources 
An alternative hypothesis for the mechanism which underlies cognitive deficits in depression is 
the executive dysfunction in allocating cognitive resources to resolve competing task demands 
in complex situations (Hasher, Zacks & May, 1999). Deficits in cognitive resources allocation 
had been suggested to be a result of , as well as a contributing factor to habitual rumination 
(Hertel, 1998; Beevers, 2005).   
To examine this hypothesis, Gotlib, Muhtadie and Levens, (2009) assessed individuals 
diagnosed with MDD and never-depressed controls using a dual-task paradigm, and explored 
how rumination was related to their performances. In the dual-task condition, all participants 
were asked to undertake a recency-probes task (a task used to examine interference of 
outdated materials on working memory) and a tracking task concurrently, in order to increase 
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the load on effective cognitive resources allocation to resolve competing task demands. The 
response times of each group were compared to those when tasks were carried out separately. 
The results showed that response times were significantly delayed when depressed patients 
carried out the dual-task condition. Otherwise, depressed and non-depressed participants 
exhibited comparable results in all other conditions. In addition, the authors found a significant 
relation between brooding and impaired resources allocation, which was only restricted to the 
depressed group. Overall these results seemed to support the hypotheses that depressive 
cognitive deficits lie in impairments to a general mechanism, rather than specific cognitive 
processes, and they are related to maladaptive rumination. However, the findings from this 
study were not able to draw a conclusion on the mechanism that underlies the exclusive effect 
of increased cognitive load on depressed patients. Also, due to the limitations of correlational 
study, empirical research will be required in the future to explore the causality in the relations 
between rumination and resources allocation deficits. 
 
Thought Controls and Suppression 
Previous research has found that thought suppression under stress can lead to an increase in 
the accessibility and thus the frequency of suppressed thoughts. It was proposed that such an 
ironic effect was due to the failure of suppression owing to depletion of cognitive resources by 
stressful experiences, and a parallel process activated by suppression which remained vigilant 
of signs of unwanted and distressing thoughts as targets for further suppression effort (Wegner, 
1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Depression is a disorder characterised by persistent negative 
thoughts. Indeed, past research has shown an association between thought suppression and 
depression (Spinhoven & van der Does, 1999; Wenzlaff et al., 2001; Wenzlaff, Rude, & West, in 
2002; Wenzlaff, Meier, & Salas, 2002). In a longitudinal study, Wenzlaff and Luxton (2003) 
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supported these findings through demonstrating that thought suppression and stress predicted 
an increase in rumination in undergraduate students. However it remained unclear what 
cognitive mechanisms underlie this relation. 
Watkins and Moulds (2009) attempted to extend previous evidence by examining the 
interrelations between thought suppression, rumination, and other thought control strategies by 
comparing the measures of these factors in individuals who are currently depressed (n=52), 
formerly depressed (n=36), and healthy controls (n=49). They reported that whereas self-
reported rumination was significantly correlated with thought suppression across the whole 
sample, there was not a specific relation between them among people with current diagnoses of 
MDD. Surprisingly, they also demonstrated no relation between rumination and any thought 
control strategies measured, including distraction. In addition, the results contrasted with 
previous studies and showed that suppression was not linked to depression. On the other hand, 
thought suppression was related to a number of thought control strategies such as distraction 
and self-deprecating thoughts. Although they partly supported past studies by showing an 
association between rumination and thought suppression, taken together, these results 
suggested that depression is linked to rumination through a different set of mechanisms to those 
that linked it to thought suppression. Future study may help clarify their relationship through 
exploring the interactional effects of rumination and thought suppression on depression. 
However, it needs to be noted that even though the RRS measured trait-like tendency to 
ruminate in response to depressed moods, its items do not specifically tap one‘s responses to 
intrusive thoughts the way those used in this study‘s Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) do. 
This mismatch in measuring instruments may in part explain the lack of relationship 
demonstrated between rumination and other thought control strategies. Also, this study relied 
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entirely on self-reported measures. Therefore its outcomes might have been influenced by 
demand effects and the beliefs of the participants.  
In another recent study, Szasz (2009) investigated the relationship between rumination and 
thought suppression in 43 Romanian inpatients with high depressive symptoms. Consistent with 
most previous findings, the author reported significant interrelations between depression, 
rumination and thought suppression. In a further mediational analysis, he showed that thought 
suppression‘s relation to depression was mediated by rumination. The author proposed that the 
mediational effect might be explained by the ironic effect of thought suppression (Wegner, 1994), 
which leads to heightened frequencies of unwanted thoughts. There are a number of limitations 
to this study, however. First, the White Bear Suppression Inventory used in this study as an 
objective measure of thought suppression was criticised for having significant overlaps with the 
RRS, which was also used (Watkins & Moulds, 2009). This might confound the result which 
suggested that rumination explained the effect of suppression. Also, the author did not establish 
the diagnostic statuses of the depressed patients in the study, hence did not control for the 
potential influences of other psychopathologies (e.g. anxiety and worries) on participants‘ 
measures of thought intrusion and suppression. 
 
Problem-solving Deficits 
Deficits in social problem-solving have long been identified as characteristic of clinical 
depression (e.g. Beck, 1976; Nezu & Ronan, 1985; Nezu, 1986). More recently, researchers 
suggested that rumination as a cognitive habit has an important role in both the onset and 
maintenance of social problem-solving difficulties in depression. For instance, Lyubomirsky and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) first posited that rumination may impair problem-solving through its 
effect on depressive mood. On the other hand, rumination, conceptualised in the S-REF theory 
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as a goal-directed self-regulatory strategy (Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1995), may also persist 
due to failure in achieving personal goals because of poor problem-solving. Several recent 
studies have examined these formulations and revealed possible mechanisms which underlie 
the influence of rumination on impairment in social problem-solving.  
Adopting Kuhl‘s (1981, 1994) conceptualisation of state-oriented rumination (or analytical 
thinking about the cause and consequence of one‘s mood states and external problems), 
Watkins and Baracaia (2002) investigated its effects on depression-related social problem-
solving impairment. Depressed (n=32), formerly depressed (n=26) and never-depressed (n=26) 
participants were subject to the Mean-End Problem-Solving Task (MEPS), in which they 
provided solutions for hypothetical social problems, after they undertook either a state-oriented 
rumination or process-focussed thinking induction. A third group of participants were assigned 
to a no-induction condition as control. Relative to never-depressed participants, who did not 
show impairment in either conditions, the depressed and formerly depressed patients showed 
significant impairments in their problem-solving after the state-oriented induction. This outcome 
was similar to those of the depressed patients in the no induction condition, which suggested 
that they had state-oriented rumination as their default thinking style. On the contrary, the 
results of depressed and formerly depressed participants were substantially improved by the 
induction of process-focussed thinking; they achieved on par with the healthy controls.  
On the whole, these results suggested that rumination impairs problem-solving in people with 
depression. In particular, the impairments demonstrated by formerly depressed participants 
implied that ruminative traits may also increase one‘s vulnerability to problem-solving deficits, 
although this could not be confirmed as the authors did not include any trait-rumination measure 
in this study.  In addition, the analyses in this study did not control for differences in levels of 
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despondency between the 3 participant groups. Therefore it was not possible to discriminate if 
rumination influences problem-solving directly or via the effects of negative mood. 
In a similar study, Watkins and Moulds (2005) examined the influence of abstract self-focussed 
vs. concrete self-focussed thinking on the social problem-solving abilities of people with 
depression. They compared 40 depressed and 40 non-depressed participants‘ performance on 
the MEPS before and after an abstract or concrete thinking induction task. Consistent with the 
reduced concreteness theory (Stober & Borkovec, 2002), the induction of concrete thinking 
increased the solution effectiveness of and number of solutions generated by participants with 
depression. Near significant opposite effects were found after the abstract thinking induction 
procedure. No such change was shown in the non-depressed group. Past research has shown 
that depressed individuals tend to have less concrete, but more abstract and overgeneral 
contents in their ruminative thinking (Watkins & Moulds, 2007). Therefore these findings 
provided evidence for the hypothesis that rumination impairs problem-solving abilities in 
depression by being less detailed and concrete, rather than, as purported previously by the RST 
by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), being self-focussed in nature alone. Unlike the previous study by 
Watkins and Baracaia (2002), this study established the baseline performance (before the 
inductions) of their participants in the problem-solving task. This allowed the authors to identify 
the specific influence of the element of rumination which caused the depression-related 
impairment in problem-solving. 
Although both trait and experimentally induced states of rumination are frequently examined in 
research of depressive cognitions, few studies explicitly distinguished their influences. In their 
study, Donaldson and Lam (2004) contrasted trait and induced rumination in terms of their 
relations with the problem-solving abilities of participants diagnosed with depression. Their 
results showed that induced rumination impaired problem-solving in depressed but not control 
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participants. This effect was paralleled by a significant relation between trait rumination and 
lowered MEPS performance in depressed patients only. Indeed, problem-solving was found to 
be predicted by the interaction between trait and induced rumination in depressed patients. This 
implied that variance in trait-rumination interfered with the effect of rumination induction. This 
finding highlighted the importance of isolating the effect of induction procedures by controlling 
for degrees of trait-rumination in considering past and conducting future studies. 
 
Evaluations and Discussions 
 
As the above review shows, rumination is undoubtedly related to a variety of cognitive 
processes which characterise depression. However, it is also clear that the current literature 
falls short of providing a consensual understanding of the nature of these relations, and how 
they might contribute to the negative effects of rumination. In this respect, several important 
issues have been raised for discussion. 
 
Conceptualisations of rumination in the reviewed studies 
20 studies reviewed used at least 1 objective measure of rumination. 19 of these studies 
involved the examination of trait-rumination using the RRS. In most cases, conclusions were 
drawn on the basis of the RRS scores on the relation between rumination and the cognitive 
processes in question. On the one hand, the RRS provides a quantified measure of rumination, 
and hence lends itself to easy comparisons with other measurable constructs. However this 
approach constricts the study of rumination to the assumptions of the Response Style Theory, 
which formulated rumination as a direct and automatic response to depressive mood (Nolen-
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Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008), and is not embedded within 
models of wider cognitive processes.  Criticism of the RRS also drew attention to the overlap of 
its items with depressive symptoms measures such as the BDI-II (Conway, Csank, Holm & 
Blake, 2000), and the lack of factor-analysis (Roberts, Gilboa & Gotlib, 1998; Treynor et al., 
2003), suggesting that it might have problems of content validity. 
As shown by recent literature reviews, rumination remains a multifaceted construct that lacks a 
clear and unified definition. Different models such as the RST and the S-REF have basic 
differences and are not necessarily complementary. Therefore, a bias in focussing on the 
understanding of rumination as measured by the RRS in research, without explicating its 
underlying assumptions, runs the risk of neglecting other dimensions of rumination, such as its 
role in emotional regulation (Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1995) and other functions (Thomsen, 
2006. This is likely to have precluded exploration of the cognitive routes through which 
rumination impacts on depressive symptoms. This might have, to some extent, prevented the 
integration of rumination research with evidence of other relevant cognitive processes, and 
therefore the agreement of a cohesive definition that draws on multiple theories and models. 
The current review shows that the literature has seen a growing shift away from this fixed 
position towards explorations of various components of rumination and their cognitive 
underpinnings. Among the reviewed studies, 5 discriminated between brooding and reflection by 
conducting separate analyses on these subscales of the RRS. 2 studies looked at the different 
effects of analytical versus experiential thinking, and 1 study compared rumination as a 
response to stress (SRR) and that to depressed mood (Robinson & Alloy, 2003). This has 
allowed the emergence of causal explanations of cognitive biases, such as overgeneral memory 
and negative biases in self-referential thinking (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Rimes & Watkins, 
2005), by aspects of rumination like self-analytical thinking. However there is as yet little 
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consensus on the core elements that distinguish between the adaptive and maladaptive 
elements of rumination.  
A separate issue arising from the review was related to the debate of trait- versus state-
rumination as markers of depression. Although studies have repeatedly demonstrated the 
prevalence of rumination as a trait-like tendency among remitted depressed patients, it has also 
been shown that negative mood states exacerbate cognitive biases, and therefore elevate the 
current state of ruminative thinking (e.g. Barnhofer, Chittka, Nightingale, Visser & Crane, 2010). 
It is therefore reasonable to speculate that the level of trait-rumination could interfere with the 
effect of experimental induction of a ruminative state. This may confound the investigation of 
rumination as either a maintenance or vulnerability factor for the onset of a particular cognitive  
deficit. It was noticed that of the 8 reviewed studies that used experimental procedures to 
induce ruminative states as part of their manipulated conditions, only 2 partialled out the their 
participants‘ initial differences in trait-rumination in their data analyses (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; 
Donaldson, Lam & Mathews, 2007). In addition, only Donaldson and Lam (2004) reported 
differential effects of trait- and state-rumination.   
 
Overall research designs 
Regarding the investigation of rumination, 14 adopted a correlational design, looking at the co-
occurrence of rumination and other cognitive variables. 8 studies had an experimental element, 
most of which used induction procedures to examine the effect of induced rumination on a 
particular cognitive process. In addition, there were 2 longitudinal studies (Spasojevic & Alloy, 
2001; Robinson & Alloy, 2003), both of which followed their participants for 2.5 years and 
evaluated the temporal relations between rumination, thinking biases and depressive symptoms. 
41 
 
The use of a correlational design in the majority of the studies might reflect the ease in 
administrative terms of this approach. These studies served to test and generate hypotheses on 
relations between variables, but are unable to provide conclusions on the causality and the 
directionality of the observed relationships.  
 
Designs, methodologies and the nature of relationships between rumination and 
cognitive processes  
This review‘s results have demonstrated intricate patterns of how rumination might be related to 
various cognitive correlates of depression.  Whereas some of these connections showed clear 
causal effects of rumination on cognitive processes, or vice versa, others remained unclear 
beyond correlations. This section provides an overview of the current state of affairs of the 
evidence on how rumination and different cognitive processes are linked, offers a critical review 
on how these findings might be limited by design and methodological issues, and also highlights 
the areas that need to be addressed in future studies. 
 
Memory 
Empirical studies have shown that rumination causes increases in overgeneral memory in 
depressed patients (Watkins, Teasdale & Williams, 2000; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). One of 
these studies showed that this effect comes specifically from high self-analytical thinking, rather 
than the more general self-focussed component of rumination. It seemed that the 
depressogenic effect of rumination is at least partly mediated by overgeneral memory, as a later 
longitudinal study demonstrated that trait-rumination explained the relation between low memory 
specificity and poorer outcomes of depression (Raes et al., 2006b). However this effect was yet 
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to be verified empirically. It is also unclear if these relations are unique to depression due to 
comorbidities of the participants and the lack of case controls in these studies. The effect of 
rumination appeared to extend beyond overgeneral autobiographical memory. Raes et al. (2005) 
showed that overgeneral memory mediated the effect of rumination on social problem-solving in 
depression patients, offering suggestions on the mechanism underlying the depressogenic 
effect of rumination. Relations were also found with other memory processes, such as reduced 
working memory and poor source memory (Raes et al., 2006a). The directions and causality of 
these relations remain inconclusive, however, due to the cross-sectional and correlational 
designs of these studies.  
In terms of methodology, it is worth noting that all 5 studies of overgeneral memory reviewed 
used the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) (Williams, 1995) as their measurement tool for 
memory specificity.  Previous critiques of the AMT had shown that the nature of the stimuli (e.g. 
verbal or visual cues) and the ways they were presented could moderate performance on the 
task through experimenter bias or the ‗imageability‘ of the stimuli (see Williams et al., 1999; 
Vreeswijk & Wilde, 2004 for details). On review of the named studies, there was little 
consistency over the nature of the stimuli used and their presentation methods, which ranged 
from oral, tape-recorded to visual presentations. The use of a standard AMT procedure is 
therefore warranted in future research. 
Review of the literature has revealed that despite strong evidence for preferential recalls of 
negative memory in depression, there is relatively little research on how such biases might be 
related to rumination. The only study identified in the literature reported no direct relation 
between brooding or reflection and memory bias (Joormann, Dkane & Gotlib, 2006). As the only 
study in this area to date, more future research is warranted to verify this result. 
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Thinking Biases 
Studies on the interrelations between rumination, negative cognitive styles, and depression 
presented a mixed picture of the most relevant components of rumination. First, although 
preliminary findings from a longitudinal study reported that high levels of negative cognitive 
styles and trait-rumination together predicted the number of prospective episodes of major 
depression (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001), later studies failed to replicate this finding (Checkley & 
Sham 2003; Robinson & Alloy, 2003). They instead suggested that such a prediction might be 
underlined by overlapping but different ruminative mechanisms. For example, Robinson and 
Alloy (2003) found that stress-reactive rumination (SRR) moderated the effect of negative 
cognitive styles on future depression, and Rimes and Watkins (2005) reported that it was the 
self-analytical, rather than self-focussed, aspect of rumination which increased negative self-
judgement in depression.  
This discrepancy might in part be an artefact of the different focuses these studies put on trait- 
and state-ruminations. For instance, while the inductions of analytical and self-focussed 
ruminative states increased maladaptive cognitive styles only in depressed participants (Rimes 
& Watkins, 2005; Lavender & Watkins, 2006), suggesting rumination maintains depressive 
symptoms, a trait-like tendency to engage in brooding seemed to be related to high negative 
cognitive styles in both healthy and depressed individuals (Lo, Ho & Hollon, 2008), indicating 
that trait rumination increases one‘s vulnerability to developing depression. Although the 
interference between trait- and state-rumination alone is unlikely to be enough to explain these 
mixed findings, it highlights the importance for future studies to discriminate between the 
influences of trait- and state-ruminations.  
Another methodological issue pertains to the predominance of self-report measures of negative 
cognitive styles in the literature. 5 out of the 6 reviewed studies used the Cognitive Style 
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Questionnaires (CSQ) or the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) as their primary measure 
of maladaptive cognitions. A methodological limitation related to self-report measures is their 
susceptibility to participants‘ interpretations as well as demand characteristics. The relevance of 
these problems to research on depressive cognitions has been recognised by recent reviews 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann & D‘Avanzato, 2010). Overall, studies which used self-
report measures were more likely to report the presence of maladaptive cognitive styles in 
depressed patients than experimental studies, which results tended to be more equivocal.  
 
Attentional biases  
Research on attentional deficits in depression and rumination is in its beginning stage. The 
current review has identified 2 studies on attentional biases in depression, which showed an 
overall relation between trait rumination and an attentional bias towards negative information 
(both negative words and sad facial expressions) for participants with depression (Donaldson et 
al., 2007; Raes et al., 2007). The same relation was however not replicated in the induction of a 
ruminative state, suggesting a dissociation between trait- and state-rumination. As evidence on 
attentional biases in depression so far is mixed, attempts to look for any differential effects of 
the various components of rumination on attentional biases might be a fruitful topic for future 
studies. Besides, no study to date has looked at the connection between rumination and 
impairment attentional control, although it has been implied as a mechanism underlying several 
other areas of executive dysfunction (e.g. Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Whitmer & Banich, 
2007). In addition, recent neuropsychological evidence has suggested that rumination might be 
related to the deficit in attentional disengagement from negative material in working memory 
(Koster, De Lissynder, Derakshan & De  Raedt, 2010). These studies indicate that the 
interrelation between attentional control on rumination might be a promising area for future 
research. 
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Inhibitory deficits 
Strong evidence suggests that rumination is related to deficits in inhibition of irrelevant materials 
during information processing of people with depression. Of the studies covered in this review, 
both of those which investigated the effect of an induced ruminative state (Watkins & Brown, 
2002) and measured trait rumination (Lau et al., 2007; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010) showed 
relations to inhibitory deficits exclusively in depressed patients. In addition, the studies reported 
that these deficits disappeared after depressed patients undertook a distraction induction, and 
were absent in formerly depressed patients. Taken together, they provided support to the 
hypothesis that inhibitory deficits in depression are the result of interference by rumination and 
other depressive symptoms, rather than a fundamental executive impairment. Additional 
findings suggested that these effects by rumination might be limited to verbal information, as 
one study found no relation between rumination and the biased inhibitory deficits of sad faces in 
depressed patients (Goeleven et al., 2006), suggesting that other mechanisms might also 
underlie depression-related inhibitory deficits.  
A related question raised by the collective findings in the literature is how rumination is related 
to the valence-specificity of inhibitory deficits in depression. Although rumination was connected 
to inhibitory deficits of negative information in the majority of the reviewed findings, research has 
also shown that it relates to inhibitory dysfunctions of general information when only emotionally 
neutral stimuli were used in experiments (e.g. MacQueen et al., 2000; Watkins & Brown, 2002). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that participants‘ performance in experimental 
paradigms which employ emotionally-valenced stimuli (e.g. negative affective priming task) 
might reflect the effects of other common depressive cognitive processes, like interpretive and 
attributional biases, along with those of rumination. Future research may remedy these 
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methodological problems by controlling for the effects of other related cognitive processes for a 
focal and direct test of the effects of rumination on inhibitory deficits. 
 
Thought control and suppression 
The current review‘s results suggested that research on rumination and thought suppression in 
depression is still in an early stage. Only one study to date has demonstrated the possibility that 
rumination may mediate the connection between depressive symptoms and thought 
suppression (Szasz, 2009). Although this lent support to the existing hypothesis about the ironic 
effect of thought suppression on the persistence of rigid and repetitive thinking (Wegner, 1994), 
other research effort was not able to replicate these findings (Watkins & Moulds, 2009). Overall, 
both studies included in this review had a correlational design, which did not allow them to draw 
conclusions on the causal effect of thought suppression on rumination. Moreover, there seemed 
to be debates on the suitability of existing measurement tools on thought control for research on 
rumination. Particular concerns were raised about whether RRS, the most commonly used 
measure of trait-rumination, was able to capture the hypothesised effect on repetitive thinking by 
thought suppression. Also, the RRS seemed to have a high level of overlap with the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory, which might have led to false positives in research outcomes. These 
issues suggest that a diversification of assessment tools and empirical studies might be fruitful 
avenues for future research. 
 
Problem-solving 
Research has demonstrated that specific components of ruminative states impair social 
problem-solving for people with depression. In particular, the inductions of state-oriented, self-
47 
 
analytical (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) and abstract thinking (Watkins & Mould, 2005) were 
shown to directly cause deficits in a problem-solving task for depressed patients. In addition to 
state-rumination, Donaldson and Lam (2004) also reported a significant relationship between 
trait-rumination and impaired problem-solving abilities in depressed patients. This suggested 
that problem-solving deficit is a vulnerability factor to, as well as a symptom of depression. 
Longitudinal studies of the long-term effects of rumination and poor problem-solving on the 
development of depression in the future may serve to confirm this finding. 
 
Limitations of the Present Review 
 
One of this review‘s potential limitations is the difficulty involved in deciding on the parameter of 
the research areas to be included. The increasing interest in rumination and its connections to 
cognitive deficits and maladaptations have given rise to several strands of studies in the 
literature. The current review purposefully focuses on exploring findings related to well-defined 
processes of cognitive functions commonly found in depression to afford specific attention to 
mechanisms underlying rumination‘s effects on clinical depression.  
However, this means this review needed to narrow its coverage to the exclusion of other well-
researched, but more general cognitive constructs which offer explanations for rumination such 
as metacognitive beliefs (e.g. Papageorgeou & Wells, 2001, 2003; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
This review also did not cover clinical research on rumination and mindfulness (e.g. Broderick, 
2005). This is due to the lack of evidence on the link between the effects of mindfulness and 
well-studied and specific cognitive processes to date. However it was possible that this 
approach had overlooked data due to the difficulties in unpicking relevant information on 
cognitive processes, which could be deduced from the intricacies in the results of these studies. 
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Although the current review focusses on studies with depressed participants, it needs to be 
reminded that a large literature on rumination and cognitions exists which included participants 
from non-clinical populations. Despite being out of the current review‘s scope, they have 
reported valuable findings that shed light on the cognitive routes through which rumination 
relates to depressive symptoms such as dysphoria. They were not included here partly due to 
the current review‘s aim to highlight the researched phenomenon in the context of major 
depression, which implies a set of vulnerability factors that is exclusive to this subset of the 
population. This is also because this review would otherwise become too lengthy and ambitious. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
With a growing awareness of the centrality of rumination as a vulnerability and maintenance 
factor for depression, the need for research into the factors underlying its detrimental effects is 
imminent. Research has consistently uncovered associations of rumination with various 
cognitive processes. However, there is a persistent lack of integration between these findings 
and studies of rumination-related psychopathologies. It is for this reason that this literature 
review set out to investigate the nature of the relations between rumination and the common 
cognitive biases and impairments related to depression as indicated by the existing body of 
research. For this purpose, it summarised research studies over the past 20 years that 
examined rumination and major cognitive processes in the context of a diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder.  
Complex patterns of relations between rumination and depressive cognitive processes emerged 
from the present findings. These include the identification of a wide range of cognitive features 
associated with rumination amongst individuals with depression. In particular, rumination was 
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shown to be connected with reduced specificity in memory, negative biases in memory recall, 
cognitive and attentional biases, deficits in inhibition and thought controls, and social problem-
solving.  All of these correspond to the known cognitive correlates of depression (see Joormann 
& Gotlib, 2010). Although the majority of the existing theories of rumination (with the exception 
of the S-REF model) (Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996) do not propose links between rumination 
and cognitive processes, theoretical frameworks that unify findings from  mainstream cognitive 
and rumination research have begun to emerge, e.g. the attention deficit hypothesis of 
rumination (Koster, Lissnyder, Derakshan & Raedt, 2011). The findings covered in this review 
are therefore potentially of use in offering a collation of data that could facilitate the formulations 
of new theoretical accounts that bring together these two approaches. 
However, despite the wealth of research data that link rumination with various cognitive 
processes and impairments, the nature of these connections are not yet conclusive. Several 
reasons have emerged from this literature review, which may provide directions for future 
research. They include the lack of consistency in the definitions of rumination adopted by the 
studies in the literature, which warrants further studies to make distinctions between and clarify 
the different sub-components of rumination. This review also emphasised a number of specific 
as well as general designs and methodological issues. The latter highlighted the limitations of 
the correlational design, which constituted a significant proportion of the literature, and the 
potential problems of not distinguishing the influences of state- and trait-rumination of 
participants. 
Finally, the clear associations between rumination and the common cognitive features of 
depression demonstrated in this review are likely to have clinical implications for the 
psychological treatment of depression. Traditional cognitive models of depression place strong 
emphases on the impacts of negative thought contents on negative mood states, while rarely 
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addressing maladaptive mental processes like rumination (e.g. Clark & Beck, 1999). This might 
offer an explanation to the research findings, which suggested that most recovered depressed 
patients continue to suffer from depressive rumination and other residual symptoms (Judd, 1997; 
Judd et al., 1999; Paykel et al., 1995). Clinical evidence has long since suggested that 
rumination contributes to the relapse of depression. This is consistent with the findings from this 
review, which show that rumination has considerable influence on cognitive processes which 
could exacerbate negative thoughts, such as thinking and attentional biases, while at the same 
time being maintained by other cognitive vulnerability factors of depression like impairments of 
inhibition and problem-solving.  
For these reasons, from a clinical perspective, the conventional distinction between the content 
and process of thoughts may be artificial and even counter-productive. More recent 
developments in cognitive therapies have seen therapy research moving away from this position, 
and the emergence of treatment models which address the process of depressive cognitions, 
e.g. the rumination-focused CBT (Watkins et al., 2007) and mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (Teasdale et al., 2000). However, many of these research areas, especially treatments 
targeting rumination, are still rudimentary. Therefore, the evidence summarised in this review on 
the various cognitive factors related to rumination may enable future researchers to more 
accurately identify critical cognitive factors that underlie the chronicity and relapse of depression 
as targets for clinical intervention.    
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Abstract 
 
There is now consistent evidence which shows that rumination increases vulnerability to 
depression and maintains depressive mood states. It is as yet unclear, however, what 
mechanisms underlie this effect. Aims: This study compared the mood-as-input theory 
prediction about perseverative rumination in participants with a diagnosis of major depressive 
disorder (MDD) with healthy controls. It also evaluated the differences in mood changes within a 
rumination bout between the two experimental groups. Methods: A structured rumination 
interview was used to facilitate participants‘ reflection on two previous depressive incidents 
while deploying a specific stop-rule (either an ―as-much-as-can‖ or ―feel-like-continuing‖ stop-
rule). Results: In line with the mood-as-input hypothesis, degrees of perseveration exhibited by 
the participants were partly determined by the interaction between diagnosis and stop-rule, with 
levels of preservation being greatest when depressed participants used the AMAC stop-rule. 
This suggests a mechanism that may contribute to perseveration in depressive rumination. On 
the other hand, increases in negative moods over the rumination interview were shown to be 
influenced only by participants‘ degree of psychopathologies, rather than their use of stop-rule. 
This study also explored depressed and control participants‘ natural thinking styles in terms of 
stop-rules. Compared to controls, depressed participants reported a biased use of ―as-much-as-
can‖ stop-rule in response to negative mood states in their everyday lives. Conclusions: Overall, 
these results suggested that the mood-as-input hypothesis successfully predicted the 
persistence of rumination in depression, but the detrimental effects of rumination was likely to 
be influenced by other depression-related factors. The present finding also indicated that 
depressed individuals may use a default ―as-many as-can‖ stop-rule. The interrelations between 
depressive moods, default stop-rule use, and trait-rumination were discussed in terms of the 
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metacognitive model of depression and rumination, in particular, their relations to positive and 
negative beliefs about the consequences of rumination. 
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Introduction 
 
Background to research 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a debilitating psychological disorder characterised by 
prolonged and recurrent periods of low mood, a loss of interest and motivation in enjoyable 
activities, sense of worthlessness and in some cases, suicidal thinking (DSM-IV, APA). 
Mounting research evidence shows that ruminative thinking is closely related to depression (see 
Rood, Roelofs, Bögels, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schouten, 2009) . Rumination can be broadly 
defined as a persistent, repetitive, and self-focussed thinking style concerned with the causes, 
meanings and consequences of dysphoric mood or stress. It was demonstrated that a tendency 
to ruminate following stressful life events predicted the retrospective as well as prospective 
onset, number and length of depressive episodes (Alloy et al., 2000; Robinson & Alloy, 2003). 
Research has also shown that rumination is a maintaining factor of depressive symptoms 
(Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004; Moberly & Watkins, 2008, 2010). Indeed, the presence of trait 
rumination has been found to impinge on the outcome of psychological therapy for depression 
(Siegle, Sagrati & Crawford, 1999; Jones, Siegle & Thase, 2008), and therefore is likely to 
contribute to future relapses.  
Although research in the past two decades has established rumination as a critical cognitive 
process in the aetiology and persistence of depression, little understanding exists on the 
mechanism underlying the relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms. The 
literature contains a range of theoretical models of rumination; most of them vary in their 
postulations of the content and focus of ruminative thinking. For instance, the response style 
theory suggests that rumination is a self-focus, repetitive thinking style triggered in response to 
depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubormirsky, 
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2008); other models argue that rumination is focussed primarily on negative emotional states 
(e.g. Conway, Csank, Holm & Blake, 2000); whereas the stress-reactive formulation of 
rumination argues that depressive rumination is precipitated by stressful life events (Alloy et al., 
2001). Despite their variations, however, these models mostly assume a direct relationship 
between rumination and their precipitating factors, and do not offer an explanative account for 
the recurrent and perseverative nature of rumination.  
One exception to this is the mood-as-input model for perseveration (Martin, Tesser & McIntosh, 
1993; Martin 1999). According to this model, rumination is not inherent to low mood or distress. 
Instead, the effect of mood states depends on the way they are interpreted in the context of a 
person‘s ‗stop-rule‘. ‗Stop-rules‘ are functional concepts used to describe the intuitive decision-
making strategies a person uses to determine whether the goal of the current task has been met 
and, therefore, when to stop their current line of thinking. In other words, rumination is viewed 
as serving a function of goal-progress or as a problem-solving attempt. In their original study of 
the mood-as-input model, Martin, Ward, Achee and Wyer (1993) first operationalised the 
evaluation of goal-progress as the ‗As-much-as-can‘ (AMAC) stop-rule during a word generation 
task. In this task, participants in either a positive or negative mood were asked to stop the task 
only when they had reached the goal of generating as many bird names as possible. The results 
were contrasted with those of the same participants when they were asked to stop when they no 
longer feel like doing it, or to follow the ‗Feel-like-continuing‘ (FLC) stop-rule. The results 
showed that participants using the AMAC stop-rule persisted in the task for longer than those 
using the FLC stop-rule only if they were in a negative mood state. The authors concluded that 
mood states carry different meaning to the participants according to the stop-rule they adopt. 
That is, they used their moods to evaluate if they had met their specific and current goal. 
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Although the mood-as-input model was proposed as a hypothesis for the mechanism underlying 
perseverative thinking in general, the majority of its research to date has been focussed on 
pathological worrying (e.g. Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003; Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & 
Paterson, 2005; Davey, Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007). In a study by Startup and Davey 
(2001), high-worriers (participants who scored highly on trait worry) were found to spend 
significantly longer than low-worriers on a worrying task only when they were asked to use an 
AMAC, rather than a FLC, stop-rule. As high-worriers reported significantly higher levels of low 
mood than low-worriers in this study, the results confirmed the mood-as-input hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the AMAC stop-rule was found to be significantly related to trait worry, shame, 
guilt and metacognitive beliefs about the positive and negative implications of worrying (Davey 
et al., 2005). These findings suggest the AMAC stop-rule is an important feature of 
perseverative thinking in worrying.  
Compared to worrying, rumination has received relatively little research interest from a mood-
as-input perspective. However, evidence from past research has suggested much similarity 
between these two cognitive processes (e.g. Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk & Heimberg, 2002). 
Despite the high rate of comorbidity between depression and anxiety, which are by convention 
related to rumination and worrying, respectively, studies have found that measures of 
rumination and worrying remained significantly correlated even after depressive and anxious 
symptoms were controlled for (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Beck & Perkins, 
2001). Similarly, Fresco and colleagues (2002) conducted a factor analysis on items from 
common worry and rumination measures, and found that the factors that emerged from these 
scales are strongly correlated with each other. In addition, both high-ruminators and -worriers 
reported to hold beliefs about the usefulness or benefits of these thinking processes (Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2001; Davey et al., 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that there are 
commonalities in the mechanisms that relate both worrying and rumination to negative moods. 
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So far, evidence for the mood-as-input model of perseverative rumination came from two 
empirical studies using a rumination interview paradigm (Watkins & Mason, 2002; Hawksley & 
Davey, 2010). The rumination interview is a structured interviewing procedure adapted from the 
catastrophising interview task (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). It was devised as a tool for objectively 
measuring ruminative perseveration and has been used effectively in previous studies. In their 
study, Watkins and Mason (2002) reported a pattern of rumination similar to that shown in 
anxious worry reported by Startup and Davey (2001). They found that individuals who rated 
highly on trait-rumination tended to perseverate for significantly longer when asked to adopt the 
AMAC stop-rule. This result was supported by a recent study which compared individuals who 
underwent positive or negative mood-inductions for the lengths of their rumination while using 
the AMAC or FLC stop-rules in the same rumination task (Hawksley & Davey, 2010). It 
demonstrated that people who were asked to use the AMAC stop-rule ruminated for significantly 
longer than their FLC counterparts only when they began in a negative mood. That is, the 
interaction of low mood and the use of the AMAC stop-rule contributed to the prolonged 
rumination they showed in the experiment. These preliminary findings affirmed the goal-
progress view of rumination (Martin, Shrira & Startup, 2004), in which subjective mood states 
are taken by a person as information indicating if sucessfully attained their current  goal (as 
described by the stop-rule).  
The view of rumination as a goal-directed activity is consistent with the self-regulatory executive 
function model (S-REF) of depression (Matthews & Wells, 1996, 2004). It posits that rumination 
is maintained by metacognitive beliefs that support self- and symptom-focussed rumination as a 
coping strategy. Studies by Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a, b & 2003) have provided evidence 
that both high-ruminators and patients diagnosed with MDD hold specific beliefs about the 
usefulness of rumination. Interestingly, Watkins and Mason‘s (2002) study showed that people 
who reported having a high degree of trait rumination exhibit a similar thinking pattern when 
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they used an AMAC stop-rule, and when they were not asked to use any stop-rule at all. This 
suggests that high-ruminators may use the AMAC stop-rule by default, although this finding has 
so far not been verified within a clinical population. For these reasons, it is possible that positive 
beliefs about the function of rumination may be related to the prolific use of the AMAC stop-rule 
amongst people with depression.  
However, to date, there has been no study investigating the mood-as-input hypothesis, as well 
as the relation of stop-rule use and metacognitive beliefs about rumination, within a clinical 
population. Such an investigation is deemed important, as there are a number of ways in which 
its outcomes may differ from those of studies with non-clinical samples alone. First of all, a 
growing body of evidence shows that people with a diagnosis of depression differ from non-
depressed individuals in both the nature and contents of their ruminative thoughts. It was found 
that people with depression are more likely to engage in brooding, a maladaptive subtype of 
rumination, rather than constructive reflection (Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
Similarly, their thinking was shown to have a reduced level of concreteness and consisted of 
more abstract thoughts (Stober & Borkovec, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2007). These 
characteristics may lead to the persistence of recurrent thinking, as people with depression are 
thought to be less effective in producing exact conclusions and solving problems. In other words, 
they may cause greater perseveration in ruminative bouts alongside the influences of mood 
states and stop-rule use.  
Most research on the mood-as-input model to date has focussed on the effect of moods and 
stop-rule on perseveration at the outset of a worry or rumination bout. This has resulted in a 
rather static view of the mechanisms underlying perseverative thinking. The only exception was 
found in a recent study which sought to investigate the evolutions of moods and stop-rules 
deployment during a worry bout over the course of a catastrophising task (Davey et al., 2007). 
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Therefore, little is known about how (or whether) specific mood states change across a single 
rumination bout. Empirical knowledge of how moods shift during rumination may help explain 
how perseverative rumination is maintained. One feasible hypothesis is the may be found in th 
emood-congruent effect, which suggests that individuals‘ cognitions tend to be biased by their 
predominant moods, and generate appraisals that would maintain or amplify their existing mood 
states (e.g. Reynolds & Salkovskis, 1992). Another possibility may be derived from the goal-
progress theory , which posits that mood changes become an indicator of goal-progression in 
the context of a stop-rule. According to this view, lowering moods are interpreted as a signal of 
not having reached the current goals and for the need to persist in rumination. Together, these 
two mechanisms may offer an explanation for the reciprocal mechanism which maintains both 
low moods and rumination. 
  
Aims and hypotheses of the study 
The current study‘s primary aim is to investigate the mechanisms underlying the association 
between rumination and negative mood states of people with depression. In particular, it 
examines perseverative rumination from a mood-as-input perspective using the rumination 
interview paradigm, i.e. to check if people‘s use of stop-rule has an effect on their rumination 
over and above the effect of mood states. On the basis of existing evidence in support of the 
mood-as-input theory, which suggests that moods interact with stop-rule to determine the extent 
of iterative thinking, this study hypothesises that 1) the interaction between mood states and 
stop-rule use will produce significant differences in perseveration between depressed and 
healthy participants, without any independent main effect of mood states or stop-rule. In 
particular, the mood–as-input hypothesis suggests that, in the context of the AMAC stop-rule, 
negative mood would be interpreted as an indication that the current goal is not being met, 
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leading to the continuation of rumination. Therefore, depressed participants are expected to 
show the most perseveration whilst using the AMAC stop-rule (Martin & Davies, 1998). 
Apart from investigating the mechanisms through which stop-rules and moods contribute to 
perseveration in depressive rumination, this study also examines the constructs that may 
underlie the use of stop-rule by people with depression.  High-ruminators and depressed 
patients have consistently reported to hold positive and negative beliefs about rumination 
(Papageorgiou and Wells, 2001 a, b, 2003). This study is expected to replicate these findings 
and 2) find positive correlations between the participants‘ rumination scores and their level of 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination.  
Previous findings suggest that high-ruminators are prone to adopting a default AMAC stop-rule 
(Watkins & Mason, 2002). As depression is found to be related to high levels of trait rumination 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), 3) the diagnosis of depression is expected to predict more 
participants choosing the AMAC than the FLC stop-rule as a better description of their thinking 
style. The role of relevant factors such as trait-rumination and positive and negative beliefs 
about rumination in the relation between depression and stop-rule use is also examined. 
Because the AMAC stop-rule was an analogue for a self-focus, ruminative thinking style, 4) it is 
hypothesised that trait-rumination and positive beliefs about rumination will at least partially 
predict the use of the AMAC stop-rule in everyday life. This study makes no prediction about the 
negative beliefs about rumination. 
In order to explore the effects of using different stop-rules on mood states between people with 
and without depression, this study compares the mood changes between depressed and non-
depressed participants during both of the stop-rule conditions in the rumination task. Although 
the relation between state-rumination and negative affects is now well established (see 
Thomsen, 2006), preliminary evidence from a study using the catastrophising task with high-
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worrying participants suggested levels of mood changes were primarily related to the degree of 
psychopathological worrying (Davey et al., 2007). Given the similarity of rumination to worry as 
an iterative thinking style, it is predicted that, 5) the rumination interview would result in a 
general increase in sadness (and decrease in happiness). However, the increase is expected to 
be greater in depressed than healthy participants, in spite of the stop-rule they use. No 
prediction is made about rumination‘s effect on anxiety, as there is little prior evidence on the 
relation between anxious moods and perseveration within a single episode of rumination.  
 
Methods  
 
Participants 
Participants with depression were recruited from the treatment list of three outpatient 
psychological therapy services in the North London Camden and Islington NHS Foundation 
Trust. They were initially referred to the study via their clinicians (clinical psychologists or 
primary care mental health workers) who obtained their consent to be contacted for the study. 
They were then contacted for a brief telephone interview with a view to introducing the study 
and gathering initial selection information. Individuals were invited to the study if they were 
fluent in English, aged between 18 and 65, and met the criteria for at least a possible 
moderately severe depression (score =/> 15) on a PHQ-9 questionnaire. Participants were 
excluded if they had a current or history of head trauma and neurological impairment. They 
were also deemed ineligible if they reported a learning disability, alcohol or substance abuse, or 
a co-morbid mental health disorder (except for anxiety disorders), such as psychotic disorder or 
bipolar disorder, currently or within the last 6 months. Participants who presented a risk of self-
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harm or suicide were also not included in the experimental procedures. All participants included 
had been on stable or no psychiatric medication for the previous 3 months. Eligible participants 
were invited for the experiment session. Their diagnostic statuses were determined by the 
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996), 
administered by the researcher to establish their diagnosis for depression. Participants were 
included in the depressed group if they met the criteria for a primary diagnosis of major 
depression without current or past organic, psychotic or manic features. Control participants 
were recruited via the University College London (UCL) online subject pool system and adverts 
on various North London local community websites. The control group consisted of individuals 
with no current or history of diagnosis of any emotional disorder. All participants were paid 
£10.00 for their participation. 
A total of 25 participants with MDD (aged 23 to 62, mean = 40.96 10 males and 15 females) and 
25 healthy control participants (aged 20 to 58, mean = 38.88, 10 males and 15 females) took 
part in the study. Among the depressed participants, 6 were medication free, 13 were on SSRIs 
medications, and 7 could not provide details on their medication. All of them were receiving or 
had received cognitive-behavioural therapy. Participants were also assessed for their 
educational background as part of the pre-study assessment. They were asked to identify 
themselves with one of the five categories denoting their highest educational levels, which 
included: 1- no qualification, 2- GCSE, 3- A-level, 4- bachelor degree, and 5- postgraduate 
education. Control participants were selected such that they were matched with the clinical 
group participants in terms of their genders, age-range, and approximate educational levels. 
They did not receive the diagnostic interview, but had taken part in all other study procedures. 
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Design 
A mixed between-subject, repeated-measure design was used whereby the two participant 
groups (depressed, control) were compared in terms of their performances in both the AMAC 
and FLC stop-rule conditions in the rumination interview task. The dependent variable is 
degrees of perseverative thinking exhibited by participants, which were quantified by the 
number of questions they answered (or steps they produced) in the rumination interview.  
The study also compared the changes of depressed and control participants‘ mood states 
(sadness, happiness, anxiety) across both the AMAC and FLC conditions of the rumination 
interview. Mood states were measured by participants‘ self-evaluations on visual analogue 
scales (VAS) (see below). Post-interview mood levels were regressed on pre-interview mood 
levels. Standardised residuals were saved and used as the dependent variable which denoted 
their mood changes across each part of the rumination interview. 
 
Assessment tools 
 
Trait rumination measure  
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) is a 22-item self-report 
measure assessing the tendency to ruminate or repetitively think about negative events after 
they occur, with rumination hypothesised to be an underlying vulnerability factor for depression 
(e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The test–retest reliability (r = 0.67) and internal consistency 
(cronbach‘s alpha = 0.90) of the RRS are adequate (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), as are 
convergent and predictive validity (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Responses are scored on a Likert scale, from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Treynor, 
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Gonzalez and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) demonstrated that once items referring to depression 
symptoms were removed, the RRS comprises two distinct factors—brooding and reflection. 
 
Symptoms of depression and anxiety 
The PHQ-9 is a self-administered 9-item measure examining the severity of symptoms 
commonly associated with depression using a 4-point Likert scale (0 = not at all, to 3 = nearly 
every day). Clinical cut-offs of scores 5, 10, 15, and above 20 represent mild, moderate, 
moderately severe and severe depression respectively. The PHQ-9 has shown strong internal 
consistency reliability (  = 0.86) and test–retest reliability (r = 0.84), as well as good construct 
validity (Kroenk & Spitzer, 2001). 
The GAD-7 is a 7-item self-report measure examining the severity of anxiety symptoms using 
the same 4-point Likert scale. Scores range from 0 to 21, with scores of 5, 10, and 15 indicative 
of mild, moderate, and severe anxiety symptoms. The GAD-7 has demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency (  = 0.92) and good test–retest and procedural reliability (r = 0.83). The 
GAD-7 has also shown good convergent, construct, criterion, procedural, and factorial validity in 
the assessment of GAD (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006; Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams, 
Manahan & Lowe, 2007).  
 
Metacognitive beliefs about rumination  
The Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b) is a 9-item 
scale that assesses positive metacognitive beliefs about the beneﬁts and advantages of 
rumination. The PBRS has shown good internal consistency (Cronbach‘s a = 0.89) and test-
retest reliability over 6 weeks (r = 0.85). Respondents are required to indicate the extent to 
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which they agree with each of the items on a 4-point rating scale ranging from 1 (do not agree) 
to 4 (agree very much).  
The Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale (NBRS; Papageorgiou et al., 2001) comprises two 
subscales assessing negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination. It has good test-retest 
reliability and high internal consistency (Luminet, 2004). The NBRS-1 is an 8-item subscale that 
assesses metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and harm associated with rumination. 
The NBRS-2 is a 5-item subscale that assesses metacognitive beliefs about interpersonal and 
social consequences of rumination. Respondents are required to indicate the extent to which 
they agree with each of the items on a 4-point rating scale ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 4 
(agree very much). 
 
 
Current mood states 
Four visual analogue scales (VAS) were used to record the current subjective mood states of 
the participants at four different time-points during the rumination interview procedure. They 
measured for the levels of sadness, happiness, anxiety and the physical alertness of the 
participants. Each mood scale consists of a 22cm straight horizontal line flanked from on each 
side by the numbers 0 and 100, each marked by the printed descriptions ‗not at all‘ and 
‗extremely‘ below them, respectively. The scales were also marked by the number 50 in the 
middle, to indicate the mid-point of the line. Participants were asked to put a cross on the scales 
where they feel best describe their mood-state in question ‗at the moment‘. The VAS‘s were 
administered four times for each participant during the experiment (Time 1: immediately before 
the rumination interview;; Time 2: after the first condition of the rumination interview; Time 3: 
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immediately after the neutral mood induction and before the second condition of the rumination 
interview; and lastly, Time 4, immediately after the second condition of the rumination interview). 
 
Procedure 
The experiment sessions took place with each participant individually in a standard clinical room 
in a North London outpatient psychological therapy service. All participants were asked to read 
the information sheet and fill in an informed consent form. They were then instructed to 
complete the PHQ-9, GAD-7, PBRS, NBRS and the RRS. Participants considered for the 
depressed experimental group then took part in the diagnostic interview before the experiment.  
 
The rumination interview and current mood recording 
Participants were asked to undertake both parts of the rumination interview, in each of which 
they were asked to adopt either an AMAC or FLC stop-rule. The orders of the stop-rule 
conditions were randomly assigned for each participant. They was also counterbalanced in both 
the depressed and control groups to control for the order effect. The two parts of the rumination 
interview were separated by a 5-minute interval, when the participants took part in a neutral 
mood induction exercise to minimise any carry-over effect. 
Participants were asked to complete a VAS mood scale before the first part of the rumination 
interview. Then they were told they would take part in an interview about two recent events that 
had made them feel depressed or sad, and asked to think of two such events which had similar 
emotional impacts on them. Once the participants confirmed that they had identified the events 
for the interview, they were then given a written instruction for the stop-rule taken from the study 
by Hawksley and Davey (2010) to ensure comparability of results.  
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The instruction for the AMAC stop-rule read that they would be ―required to continue with the 
interview until they had fulfilled the goal of exploring the event as much as they can‖. Whereas 
the instruction for the FLC stop-rule says that they would be ―required to take part in the 
interview until they did not feel like continuing to do it‖. The participants were checked for their 
complete understanding of the stop-rule instructions before they proceeded to the interview. 
Print-outs of the instructions were placed in front of the participants throughout the interview as 
reminders of the task requirement during their interviews. 
The interviewer first asked the participant to name ―one of the incidents‖ (or ―the other incident‖ 
in the second part) identified and recalled by them. This was followed by a structured procedure 
consisting of the interviewer asking repetitively, ―What is it about X that made you feel 
depressed (or sad for the healthy control participants)?‖, where X is always the participants‘ 
answer to the interviewer‘s previous question. In other words, in the rumination interview, the 
subsequent question always depends on the previous answer given by the interviewee. This 
structured and standardised form of interviewing was adopted for the interview in order to 
minimise any experimenter bias in the way the questions are worded. For ease of administering 
the interview and to facilitate an objective quantification of the length of each rumination 
interview, participants were asked to limit their response to no longer than one idea or one 
sentence per answer. The number of answers produced (quantified as ‗steps‘) and the contents 
of the answers were recorded by the interviewer during the task. Each interview was only 
brought to a close when the participant indicated that they could think of no more response in 
the AMAC condition, or they did not want to continue in the FLC condition. The participants 
were asked to complete three more VAS mood scales; first, immediately after part one of the 
ruminative interview finished, then immediately before and after the second part of the interview.   
The procedures for both parts of the interview are exactly the same except for the participants‘ 
stop-rule condition.  
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The neutral mood induction 
After the first part of the interview, participants were asked to take a 5-minute break, during 
which they would be asked to listen to a piece of music and the interviewer would leave the 
room. They were then asked to put on a pair of headphones connected to an mp3 player 
containing the music. The same piece of music (the Waltz in C sharp minor by Chopin) was 
used for all participants. The waltz was chosen based on the finding from a previous study 
which reported that it worked effectively as a neutral mood induction device (Startup & Davey, 
2001).  
 
Stop-rule identification  
 
After the rumination interview was completed, each participant was asked to choose the stop-
rule that more strongly resembled the thinking style they adopt in response to negative moods in 
their daily life. They were asked  ―Between the AMAC and FLC stop-rules, which one could you 
more strongly identify with?‖ Participants were encouraged to choose the one they use more 
often if they could not immediately decide. 
 
Debrief 
All participants were fully debriefed on the aim of the study and the purpose of its procedures. 
They were also given a chance to ask any questions. Participants who may have expressed 
continued feelings of distress or were upset during the interview were offered an opportunity to 
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participate in a brief relaxation exercise consisting of mindfulness meditation, instructed by the 
researcher. 
 
Ethical considerations 
This study was reviewed and approved by the North London Research Ethics Committee (ref: 
10/H0721/40; See Appendix A). All participants were given verbal and written information about 
the study and completed an informed consent form before they took part. A substantial body of 
research has now reported the use of the catastrophising or rumination interview paradigm 
adopted by the present study. Although the interviewing procedure which involved discussing in 
depth personal events associated with participants‘ negative emotions, most participants did not 
any report lasting effect on their mood states. Potentially risky and vulnerable people were 
excluded from the study at the screening stage, and it was conducted under the supervision of a 
qualified clinical psychologist. Participants who expressed any experience of distress after the 
experiment were offered a relaxation exercise instructed by the researcher. They were advised 
in the event of any future distress related to this study to contact the experimenter. 
 
Statistical analysis 
All statistical analysis was undertaken using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS 18.0). Data assumptions for each procedure were tested prior to analysis. All data were 
checked for univariate outliers which, when necessary, were removed. In case of skewed data 
distributions, data transformations were undertaken prior to analysis. An Alpha level of .05 was 
used for all statistical tests.  
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The differences in the number of ‗steps‘ produced by the participants of both groups in the 
rumination interview across the two stop-rule conditions were analysed by a 2(group) x 2(stop-
rule) mixed-design ANOVA.  The two stop-rule conditions were designed as analogues of 
different ruminative thinking styles. In order to test the specificity of the analysis outcomes to the 
experimentally manipulated stop-rules, and to ascertain if trait-rumination influences task 
performance, the same analysis was repeated with trait-rumination (RRS) scores as a covariate. 
Higher numbers of steps produced by participants were used as an index of the level of 
perseverative thinking while using a particular stop-rule. 
In order to test whether the diagnosis of MDD and other related factors predict a bias in the 
natural use of stop-rule, a hierarchical logistic regression analysis was performed. The stop-rule 
participants reported identifying with most in their daily life was entered as the dependent 
variable. The diagnostic groups (depressed, control) of the participants were entered as a 
predictor in the first step. To determine the extent to which depressive symptoms can explain 
the prediction of a biased stop-rule use by the diagnosis of depression, PHQ-9 scores were 
added as a predictor in the second step. This was followed by entering the RRS brooding 
subscale scores in the third step as predictors to determine if trait-rumination predicts the 
participants‘ use of stop-rule in their daily life above and beyond depressive symptoms. With the 
first and second steps unchanged, positive and negative beliefs about rumination scales scores 
were entered as predictors in the third steps in two separate regression analyses to help clarify 
the role of metacognitive beliefs in the use of stop-rule. 
In order to compare mood changes (sadness, happiness and anxiety) between groups across 
both conditions of the rumination interview, all post-interview VAS mood ratings were regressed 
on the pre-interview mood ratings for both stop-rule conditions (AMAC and FLC). Standardised 
residuals were saved and analysed by 2 x 2 repeated measure ANOVAs with group (depressed, 
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control) as the between-subject factor, and stop-rule (AMAC, FLC) as the within-subject factor. 
The assumption of sphericity was checked using the Mauchly‘s test. The results showed that 
the assumption was tenable in each case.  
 
Results 
 
Sample characteristics 
 
Table 2. shows the demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample. There are no 
significant differences between the depressed and control groups in age, t(48) = 2.017,p= .64, 
and gender, X2(1) = 0 ,p= 1.00. Educational backgrounds were also compared between groups. 
Combining categories (1 with 2, and 4 with 5) was necessary to yield cell frequencies large 
enough for a chi-square analysis. No significant group difference was reported, X2(3) = 2.21, 
p=.36. As previous research has suggested a significantly higher female tendency to engage in 
rumination in response to low mood (see Nolen-Noeksema & Jackson, 2001), all analyses were 
initially performed with gender as a between-subject factor. However, there was no significant 
effect or interactions with gender on any of the dependent variables; therefore all reported 
analyses were conducted by collapsing across genders. Before commencing the experiment, 
the depressed group showed significantly higher scores of low mood and general depressive 
symptom on the PHQ-9, t(48) = 15.51 , p<.01 . As the mood-as-input hypothesis predicts that 
positive and negative moods interact differently with use of stop-rule to produce varied 
outcomes in perseverative thinking, it renders the participant groups valid for the purpose of the 
present study. Depressed participants also reported a higher rating on anxiety measured by 
GAD-7, t(48) = 8.84 , p<.01 . 
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There was a significant difference between the depressed and healthy participants in the total 
RRS score, t(48)= 5.09, p<0.01 , as well as the ratings on the brooding subscale, t(48)= 5.87, 
p<0.01 and the reflection subscales, t(48)= 4.61, p<.01. There were significantly higher levels of 
both positive and negative levels of beliefs about rumination reported by depressed than healthy 
participants. [PBRS:  t(48) = 4.59, p<.01; NBRS: t(48) = 4.04, p<.01]. As the mean total RRS 
scores for both the depressed and controls groups were significantly correlated with their mean 
brooding (Depressed: r = .886, p<.01; Controls: r = .805, p<.01) and reflection subscales scores 
(Depressed: r = .871, p<.01; Controls: r = .680, p<.01), only the total RRS scores were used in 
further analyses.  
Table 2. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample 
 Control group (N= 25) Depressed group (N= 25) Test statistic (t) p 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d.   
Age (in years) 38.88 12.65 40.96 12.16 2.017 .64 
Gender   
male (female) 
10(15) - 10(15) - - - 
PHQ-9 2.80 2.08 16.64 3.95 15.51 <.01 
GAD-7 2.64 2.23 14.32 6.22 8.84 <.01 
RRS 39.88 10.32 66.40 13.86 5.09 <.01 
    Brooding 9.40 3.19 15.44 4.047 5.87 <.01 
    Reflection 9.04 2.39 13.52 4.23 4.61 <.01 
PBRS 16.84 4.46 24.80 6.42 4.59 <.01 
NPRS 19.24 5.17 29.28 8.99 4.04 <.01 
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To determine the relation between metacognitive beliefs and rumination, correlations were 
computed between the participants‘ trait-rumination (RRS) scores and their PBRS and NBRS 
scores separately for the depressed and control participants (see Table 3 below). 
 
Table 3. Correlations of RRS scores and PBRS and NBRS scores in depressed and control 
groups 
 RRS  
 Depressed (N= 25) Controls (N= 25) 
PBRS .407* .480* 
NBRS .412* .572** 
RRS= Mean total rumination response scale scores; PBRS = Mean positive beliefs about rumination 
scales score; NBRS = Mean negative beliefs about rumination scales score; *p< .05; **p< .01 
 
 
Rumination interview  
 
Depression, stop-rules and mood changes in rumination interview 
A mood check was conducted to examine the effect of the neutral mood induction on the 
participants‘ mood states between the stages of the rumination interview. The aim of the 
induction procedure was to neutralise the impact on moods of the first stage of the rumination 
interview before participants commenced  the second stage. Analyses using paired-sample t-
tests found no significant differences in levels of the VAS ratings for sadness, t(49)=.379, 
P=.706, happiness, t(49)= -1.78, p=.082 and anxiety, t(49)=.0781, p=.11, of all participants at 
time 1 (before the beginning of the rumination interview) and time 3 (after the relaxation task). 
Table 3 shows the mean VAS mood ratings (for sadness, happiness, and anxiety) taken at the 4 
time points before and after both stages of the rumination interview.  
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Participants‘ self-ratings of mood states using the VAS at different stages of the rumination 
interview were summarised in Table 4. To calculate mood changes across the interview task, 
participants‘ post-interview (time 2 & time 4) mood ratings were adjusted for their pre-interview 
(time 1 & time 3) ratings by saving the standardised residuals of a linear regression model, with 
pre-interview mood ratings as the independent variable and post-interview mood rating as the 
dependent variable. These standardised residuals represent the remaining variation in post-
interview mood ratings after that of the pre-interview ratings. Residuals were computed for all 
mood states measured by VAS, i.e. sadness, happiness and anxiety. They were assessed for 
normal distribution and then analysed using a 2 (group) x 2 (stop-rule) mixed-design ANOVA. 
The results showed a general effect which demonstrated increases in negative moods (sadness 
and anxiety) and decreases in positive mood (happiness) for all participants in both stop-rule 
conditions of the rumination task (see table 3). In specific, analysis of residuals for sadness 
indicated a significant main effect of group, F(1,48)=6.724, p=.013, but no significant main effect 
of stop-rule conditions, F(1,48)=.00, p=1.00 or significant group X stop-rule interaction, 
F(1,48)=0.049, p=.826. For anxiety, the results showed a significant main effect of group, 
F(1,48)=11.932, P.01. However, similar to the results for sadness, there were no significant 
effects of stop-rule conditions, F(1,48)= 0, p=1.00, or interaction between group and stop-rule, 
F(1,48)=0.227, p=.636. That is, depressed participants experienced greater increases in 
sadness and anxiety than controls during the rumination interview, regardless of the stop-rule 
they used. With regard to levels of happiness, no significant main effect of group, F(1,48)= 1.13, 
p= .258 or stop-rule, F(1,48)=0, p= 1.00 or any group X stop-rule interaction was found, 
F(1,48)=.192, p= .664. This showed that there was no significant difference in the changes of 
happiness levels between depressed and control participants. 
To control for the influence of individual difference in trait-rumination, the 2 x 2 ANOVA was 
performed again with RRS scores as a covariate. The results indicated that the effect of group 
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on changes in sadness was no longer significant, F(1,47)=2.093, p=.155. Similarly, the main 
effect of group on changes in anxiety disappeared, F(1,47)=1.804, p=.186.  
 
Table 4. Mean and standard deviations of VAS mood ratings during the rumination interview for 
depressed and control participants 
 Sadness Anxiety Happiness 
 Depressed Controls Depressed Controls Depressed Controls 
Time 1 41.80 (25.24) 20.12 (22.86) 49.68 (26.31) 25.44 (25.84) 40.12 (25.24) 57.00 (22.71) 
Time 2 58.60 (24.68) 35.40 (22.27) 57.80 (25.45) 24.72 (25.15) 31.80 (24.68) 48.92 (23.44) 
Time 3 39.12 (25.06) 22.60 (16.01) 35.48 (22.60) 17.48 (20.92) 45.12 (25.06) 57.96 (20.48) 
Time 4 40.12 (23.83) 33.96 (23.87) 58.12 (22.12) 25.72 (25.07) 35.60 (23.83) 50.28 (25.74) 
Note. Values of standard deviations in parentheses. Time 1 = First condition pre-interview; Time 2 = First 
Condition post-interview; Time 3= Second condition pre-interview; Time 4 = Second Condition post-
interview 
 
 
Depression, stop-rules and perseveration in rumination interview 
An initial analysis examined the order effects (order of the two stop-rule conditions) on the 
number of rumination steps produced by participants in both experimental groups. The result 
showed that there was no significant effect of the counterbalancing variable, F(1,48)=.852, 
p<.01, suggesting that order effects were not significant.  
Figure 1 shows the mean number of rumination ‗steps‘ produced by depressed and control 
participants while using the AMAC and FLC stop-rules. To test the hypothesis that depression 
and stop-rule would interact to affect the degree of ruminative perseveration, a 2 x 2 mixed-
design ANOVA was conducted, to compare each group (depressed, healthy control) across the 
two stop-rule conditions of the rumination interview (AMAC, FLC). The results showed that there 
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was a significant main effect of group, F(1,48)=7.287, p= <.01, stop-rule, F(1, 48)=82.747, 
p< .01, as well as a significant interaction of group and stop-rule, F(1, 48)=27.912, p<.01, for the 
number of rumination steps produced. To test the influence of the variation in individual 
differences in levels of trait rumination in the sample, the 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was 
repeated with the participants‘ brooding subscale scores as a covariate. The group X stop-rule 
interaction remained significant, F(1,48)=12.293, p< .01. However, there was neither a main 
effect of stop-rule, F(1,48)=3.036, p=.088, nor a main effect of group, F(1,48)=1.002, p=.322 
after this adjustment. This means that, after controlling for the influence of trait-rumination, only 
the interaction between group and stop-rule use continued to have an effect on the number of 
steps produced by participants in the rumination task.  
To clarify these findings, post-hoc analyses showed that participants in the depressed group 
who used the AMAC stop-rule produced significantly more rumination steps than those who 
used the FLC stop-rule, t(24) = 8.181, p<.01. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, participants in the 
control group who used the AMAC stop-rule produced significantly more rumination steps than 
those used the FLC stop-rule, t(24) = 3.347, p= .03.   In addition, the depressed group 
generated a significantly higher number of steps than the control group while using the AMAC 
stop-rule, t(48) = 3.476, p< .01, but the groups did not differ from each other significantly when 
they used the FLC-stop-rule, t(48) = .004, p=.997.  
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Figure 1. Mean number of rumination steps produced by depressed and control participants in 
both stop-rule conditions 
 
The use of stop-rule in everyday life  
 
Table 5.  Number of participants identifying the use of either default stop-rule in depressed and 
control groups 
 Depressed (N=25) Control (N=25) 
AMAC 22 10 
FLC 3 15 
Note. AMAC = ―as-much-as-can‖ stop-rule; FLC = ―Feel-like-continuing‖ stop-rule. Chi-square 
test: X2(1)= 12.50, p<.01 
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Table 4 shows the number of participants who identified AMAC and FLC stop-rules as the best 
descriptions of their predominant thinking styles, in depressed and control groups. A series of 
hierarchical logistic regressions were conducted to investigate if a diagnosis of depression and 
associated factors predicts a biased use of stop-rule in the participants‘ daily lives. The 
participants‘ self-reported tendency of using a particular stop-rule was the dependent variable in 
all analyses. Entering the participants‘ diagnostic status (depressed, healthy control) as a 
predictor, the first step of the analysis showed that a diagnosis of depression significantly 
predicts the use of the AMAC stop-rule, b= -2.34, p<.01. When depressive symptoms scores 
(PHQ-9) were added as a predictor in the second step, it significantly predicted stop-rule use, b 
= -0.532, p= .013, but reduced the prediction of diagnostic status to non-significant, b= 3.92, 
p= .112. In the third step, there was no significant prediction of stop-rule use when RRS 
brooding subscale scores were entered as a predictor, b= .004, p= .975, and the prediction of 
PHQ-9 scores, although slightly reduced, remained significant, b= -.535, p=.025. This means 
there might be some slight overlaps in the variables measured by the brooding subscale and the 
PHQ-9.  
To test if the levels of positive and negative beliefs about rumination also predict the use of a 
particular stop-rule, two hierarchical logistic regression analyses were performed with PBRS 
and NBRS scores separately entered as predictors of stop-rule use in addition to diagnostic 
status and depressive symptoms scores. The results indicated that neither PBRS scores, b= -
0.124, p= .128, nor NBRS scores, b = -0.06, p= .376 predicts the participants‘ use of stop-rule in 
daily lives, independently of their diagnostic status and severity of depressive symptoms. 
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Discussion 
 
Mood-as-input and perseverative rumination in depression 
This study aimed to investigate the factors and mechanisms that contribute to perseverative 
rumination among individuals with MDD and healthy controls using a rumination interview 
paradigm. In the present sample, results confirmed the prediction derived from the mood-as-
input hypothesis (Davey, 2006), and suggested that an interaction between diagnostic group 
and stop-rule determined the level of perseveration in the rumination task. This challenged the 
postulation that rumination is a direct response to symptoms of depression (e.g. Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). As predicted, results showed that participants with MDD were most 
persistent at the rumination task whilst using an AMAC stop-rule. On the other hand, the extent 
of perseveration in the FLC condition is comparable between the two experimental groups. 
These findings are largely consistent with those reported by previous studies, which assessed 
the performance of non-clinical samples in the rumination interview (Hawksley & Davey, 2010; 
Watkins & Mason, 2002).  
However, the current study also found that participants‘ performances in the rumination task 
reflected the independent main effects of diagnosis and stop-rule, which were not found in past 
studies with non-clinical samples. In this regard, further analysis shows that, when individuals‘ 
variation of trait rumination (the RRS scores) was controlled for, the independent effects of 
diagnosis and stop-rule disappeared, whereas interaction of diagnosis and stop-rule remained.. 
This suggests that, for people with MDD, dispositional proneness to ruminate may influence 
their perseveration in thinking through its impact on mood states and the person‘s intuitive use 
of stop-rule. This is consistent with the evidence, which shows that trait rumination is associated 
with increased negative affects in response to stress (Moberly & Watkins, 2008), and the finding 
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that people with high trait-rumination tend to adopt a default AMAC stop-rule (Watkins & Mason, 
2002). Nevertheless, it is also plausible to interpret this finding in terms of the mood-as-input 
hypothesis, i.e. it reflects that trait-rumination is a consequence of the combination of recurrent 
low moods and a rigid and persistent use of a particular stop-rule. 
The present study attempted to further elucidate the interrelation between depression, trait-
rumination and stop-rules. When asked to identify a stop-rule that best describes their thinking 
strategy in everyday life (i.e. the stop-rule they tend to naturally adopt), depressed participants 
reported a significant bias towards using the AMAC stop-rule. Although such a bias was 
predicted by both depressive symptoms and trait-rumination scores, regression analyses 
showed that only depressive symptoms scores predicted the use of stop-rule independently. In 
other words, the result did not show trait rumination as having a significant role over and above 
depressive symptoms in predicting the natural use of AMAC stop-rule in everyday life. This was 
somewhat surprising, since the AMAC stop-rule was designed as an analogue for the 
ruminative and repetitive thinking style commonly reported in depression. This suggests that 
depressive symptoms mediated the influence of trait rumination on the stop-rules people 
naturally adopt. Specifically, this implies that the adoption of a default AMAC stop-rule by people 
with depression is related to the severity of their depressive symptoms either directly or via 
other mechanisms related to depression. This interpretation of the results found support in a 
cross-study comparison of the present findings with a previous study which used the same 
experimental paradigm (Watkins and Mason, 2002). Together these studies showed that, 
among individuals with high levels of trait-rumination, depressed participants perseverated for 
considerably longer than healthy individuals when they were using the AMAC stop-rule. 
More research is necessary to clarify how depressive symptoms affect an individual‘s inclination 
towards the adoption of a particular stop-rule, but a number of possibilities exist. The literature 
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on cognitive deficits associated with depression has demonstrated that people with depression 
tend to have a reduced ability to inhibit pre-potent or habitual responses, which is likely to result 
in increased inflexibility and difficulties to alter their pattern of thinking (Watkins & Brown, 2002; 
Deveney & Deldin, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). With these inhibitory deficits, people with 
depression may find it harder than healthy individuals to find alternative strategies to focussing 
on their depressive symptoms or negative events in order to solve their problems. Secondly, 
research has found that depressed individuals are characterised by reduced concreteness in 
their thinking (e.g. Stober & Borkovec, 2002). This has been shown to result in the impairment 
of problem-solving skills consistently found in depression (Watkins & Mould, 2007). One of the 
explanations for this is that reduced concreteness limits the generation of detailed, specific and 
elaborated thinking required to evaluate progress in reaching one‘s goal. This may render 
people with depression more likely to focus on changes in their current mood states, as 
relatively more accessible goal-related information, to gauge their goal-progression (Martin, 
Strack & Stapel, 2001). As rumination often engenders negative emotions, they are more likely 
to continue, rather than terminate, the use of rumination as a problem-solving strategy.  
A third possible explanation may lie in the tendency for many depressive individuals to set 
unrealistically high standards for their performances. Previous research on depression and 
personality style has repeatedly confirmed a positive correlation between depression and 
perfectionism (e.g. Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Shafran & Mansell, 2001; Flett & Hewitt, 2002; Ashby, 
Rice & Martin, 2006). This association is at least partly related to the tendency of perfectionists 
to make self-critical evaluations, thus their increased vulnerability to negative affects and other 
depressive symptoms (Blatt, Quinlan, Pilkonis, & Shea 1995; Enns, Cox & Clara, 2002). In view 
of this, depressive participants who set unrealistic demands on themselves to fulfil their current 
goals were more likely than healthy controls to persist and perseverate in their way of thinking.  
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Although these are plausible hypotheses for the connection between depression and the 
readiness of depressed individuals to adopt the AMAC stop-rule, it is beyond the scope of the 
present study to confirm any of them. Future studies which empirically address specific 
cognitive deficits in depression and take consideration of stop-rule use will be necessary to 
verify these explanations.  
 
Metacognitive beliefs, natural use of stop-rule and rumination 
The current finding that depressive symptoms predict the adoption of a default AMAC stop-rule 
by depressed individuals over trait-rumination suggests that the natural use of AMAC stop-rule 
is not simply an analogue representation of trait-rumination, but is related to other depression-
related constructs. Plausible candidates include the cognitive deficits related to depression as 
noted above, as well as metacognitive beliefs about the consequences of rumination. The latter 
is supported by the current study as positive beliefs about rumination were found to be a 
significant predictor of natural stop-rule use by participants. This is consistent with the results 
reported by Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson (2005) in their study on worrying, 
which showed that metacognitive beliefs about the positive and negative consequences of 
worrying significantly predicted the use of the AMAC stop-rule in the catastrophising task. This 
confirms the commonality between worrying and rumination as iterative thinking styles. However, 
Davey et al. (2005) did not include their participants‘ symptom scores as a co-predictor. This is 
relevant as, similar to trait-rumination, the prediction by positive or negative beliefs about 
rumination in the current study was found not to be independent from depressive symptoms, 
suggesting that the influences of both trait-rumination and metacognitive beliefs on stop-rule use 
are mediated by the severity of one‘s depression.  
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Although further research is clearly required to clarify the relations between metacognitive 
beliefs, rumination, depressive symptoms and natural stop-rule use, the present preliminary 
findings seem to fit well into the meta-cognitive model of rumination and depression proposed 
by Papageorgiou and Wells (2003). According to this model, positive beliefs about rumination 
motivate sustained rumination in response to low mood, which leads to increases in depressive 
symptoms. Subsequently, through a feedback loop, depressive symptoms maintain the positive 
beliefs about rumination (or beliefs about the need to ruminate in order to cope effectively) 
through their impact on metacognitive efficiency (confidence about one‘s cognitive abilities due 
to cognitive deficits related to depression) (see Smith & Alloy, 2009).  
It is noted that ‗stop-rule‘ is not a part of the metacognitive model. However, it may be 
understood in terms of the existing components in the model for the benefit of elucidating the 
present findings. A useful conceptualisation of stop-rule (AMAC) may be drawn from the study 
by Papageorgiou and Wells (2001a), who explored depressed patients‘ positive beliefs about 
rumination. They reported that the patients‘ beliefs appeared to reflect themes about rumination 
as a problem-solving strategy. This is consistent with the mood-as-input model, which 
formulates stop-rules as problem-solving approaches based on perceived goal-progress (Martin, 
Achee, Ward & Wyer, 1993). Therefore, stop-rules (especially the AMAC stop-rule) may be 
considered as an operationalisation of positive beliefs about the benefits of rumination. This is to 
be distinguished from a causal relation between these beliefs and stop-rule.  
This conceptualisation of stop-rule allows it to be interpolated into the metacognitive model for 
the purpose of understanding its role in relation to the other better-studied components. One 
way future study may test the current findings about the role of stop-rule in the metacognitive 
model is to empirically test a tentatively updated metacognitive model, by substituting ‗positive 
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beliefs‘ in the model with the AMAC stop-rule, while leaving ‗positive beliefs‘ outside of the 
feedback loop but remaining linked with AMAC stop-rule as a moderating factor.  
 
 
Mood changes in perseverative rumination  
Finally, the present study examined the mood impact of the rumination interview for depressed 
and healthy individuals when compared across the two stop-rule conditions. The findings 
reported main effects of diagnostic group on sadness and anxiety change. In other words, 
depressed participants showed significantly greater increases in both sadness and anxiety than 
the controls across the rumination task when using both the AMAC and FLC stop-rules. These 
changes appeared to be unrelated to the effect of the stop-rule used by the participants, as no 
main effect of stop-rule was found in the analysis. Moreover, an analysis of covariance revealed 
the effect of depression on mood changes to be a function of trait-rumination (as measured by 
the RRS), suggesting a relation between trait-rumination and a vulnerability to negative moods. 
This finding is consistent with existing evidence on negative affects and rumination (see 
Thomsen, 2006).  
Notably, the present findings are very similar to those reported by Davey, Eldridge, Drost & 
MacDonald (2007). They showed that people who reported to have high trait-worry tended to 
exhibit increases in negative, but decreases in positive moods, over the course of a 
catastrophising task regardless of the stop-rule they deployed. To make sense of these findings 
from a mood-as-input perspective, Davey et al. (2007) carried out an experiment in the same 
study to examine if worriers‘ use of stop-rule changes over the course of the catastrophising 
task. The outcomes found participants reporting a significant shift from using the AMAC to the 
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FLC stop-rule across the task. Although the scope of this study does not permit the verification 
of this hypothesis with the present findings, given the similarity between rumination and 
worrying as perseverative thinking styles (Fresco et al., 2002), it is reasonable to speculate that 
this phenomenon might generalise to people with depression. In fact, this hypothesis is 
consistent with anecdotal information provided by a number of participants, who expressed that 
they stopped the interview in the AMAC condition partly because they found the rumination 
interview upsetting (which indicates deployment of the FLC stop-rule). If this is the case, then 
the lack of effect of stop-rule use on mood changes during the rumination task might be 
explained by the inconsistency of stop-rule use during the task.  
Another possible reason for the lack of demonstrated effect of stop-rule manipulation on mood 
change is the poor adherence of participants to the stop-rule instruction during the rumination 
task. This is particularly relevant to the depressed group as their higher trait-rumination 
(dispositional tendency to ruminate) might have overridden the stop-rule instruction as the 
rumination interview wore on. This explanation would be consistent with the current finding that 
the level of trait-rumination rather than stop-rule manipulation explained the participants‘ mood 
changes. However, depressed participants had produced significantly less steps in the 
rumination task when using the FLC stop-rule. This demonstrated that the stop-rule instructions 
had a considerable impact on their perseverative behaviour. Altogether, this indicates that 
depressed participants might have experienced greater increases in negative mood for each 
‗step‘ they produced during the rumination interview. This is possible as research has suggested 
that trait rumination is related to negative biases in interpretations, appraisals and future thinking 
in people with depression (Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Lo, Ho & Hollon, 
2008). In particular, Rimes and Watkins (2005) found that depressed patients who engaged in 
self-analytical and self-focussed thinking reported a significantly lower self-judgement than non-
depressed controls on their lovability, competence and acceptability.  It may be possible that, 
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due to these cognitive biases, depressed participants had experienced more rapid increases in 
negative moods than controls over the rumination task. 
Another noteworthy finding is the result which showed that depressed participants had 
experienced greater increases in anxiety than sadness across both conditions of the rumination 
task. Although the main emotion associated with depression is sadness, this result highlighted 
that rumination may occur alongside a wide variety of emotions. Past research has most notably 
reported anxiety, anger and stress (see Thomsen, 2006). More recently, a study which explored 
the phenomenological experiences of rumination with patients with MDD had reported that their 
rumination was often accompanied by low mood, anxiety, anger, hopelessness, sense of 
entrapment, and to a lesser extent, humiliation (Pearson, Brewin, Rhodes & McCarron, 2008). 
The authors reasoned that this is possibly because depressive rumination is often characterised 
by complex appraisals, which give rise to complex emotional states. Another explanation is the 
high comorbidity between depression and anxiety disorders, which is highly applicable for the 
current depressed participants due to their high-level anxiety symptoms (as measured by GAD-
7). 
 
Limitations of the study 
It is important to take into account some methodological limitations of the current study when 
interpreting its results. First, the interpersonal format of the rumination interview inevitably raises 
questions about its validity as a measuring tool of perseveration in rumination, an essentially 
intrapersonal process. This is particularly relevant in the context of the goal-progress theory of 
rumination, which views rumination as a goal-directed behaviour (Martin, Shrira & Startup, 
2004). The theory posits that ruminators interpret their mood states as a yardstick of their goal-
progress to determine whether they need to continue with their current activity (i.e. rumination) 
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only in the absence of more accessible goal-related information (Martin, Strack & Stapel, 2001). 
In this sense, an interpersonal dimension may complicate the measuring, as it may potentially 
introduce variables which could lend themselves to interpretation as goal-related information, 
such as the experience of being listened to, interpersonal attention, and the feeling of emotional 
validation, depending of the goals of the ruminators. If this is the case, factors other than moods 
may interact with stop-rules to affect the length of perseveration. Nonetheless, past studies 
using the rumination interview or similar paradigm (e.g. catastrophising interview) have 
produced mood changes and perseveration similar to a natural rumination or worrying bout (e.g. 
Watkins & Mason, 2002; Davey et al., 2005, 2007; Hawksley & Davey, 2010), suggesting that 
the paradigm can effectively imitate the internal iterative thinking process. However, future 
studies may further mitigate the potential influences of interpersonal factors on the ruminative 
process by adapting the paradigm, such as by using recorded interview questions or a 
microphone, instead of a face-to-face interview. 
Secondly, the current study included a repeated-measure component in order to control for 
individual variance, i.e. measuring mood changes and perseveration of the same participants 
over both stop-rule conditions of the rumination task. However, this design renders the 
experiment vulnerable to carry-over effect across the two parts of the rumination interview. In 
order to minimise this disadvantage, the order of the stop-rule conditions was counterbalanced, 
and a relaxation exercise was introduced in the interval between the two parts of the task. 
Although the present results indicated that the relaxation task effectively restored the mood 
states of the participants to their pre-interview levels, it is unclear if other effects of the first 
interviews, such as negative thoughts, had remained. Additional state measures of cognitions 
may be introduced to verify this in future research. 
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Third, although this study recruited participants with clinical depression, it did not analyse the 
influences of specific vulnerability factors of depression on moods and perseveration except for 
the levels of trait-rumination. Therefore, other correlates of depression, such as negative 
attributional styles and cognitive deficits, might have confounded the outcomes of participants‘ 
performance in the rumination interview. However, these influences were expected to be small 
as past research has suggested (trait-) rumination to be a common mechanism which mediates 
the effects of various risks factors to depression (e.g. Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).  
Finally, this study assessed participants‘ default stop-rule using a direct question which asked 
them to identify the stop-rule they tend most to use in their everyday life. Although this self-
report method yielded valuable preliminary findings about the different stop-rules depressed and 
non-depressed participants tend to adopt by default, it is also vulnerable to response biases and 
demand effects. This may be overcome empirically by introducing a third, no stop-rule condition 
into the rumination interview, which would allow measurements of the participants‘ 
perseverative behaviours while they use the stop-rule they naturally adopt.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This is the first mood-as-input study on depressive rumination which includes participants with 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Using the rumination interview paradigm, the results 
confirmed the mood-as-input hypothesis (Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003) and showed that the 
interaction between depressive symptoms and stop-rules significantly influenced the degree of 
perseverative thinking. However, the results also suggested that compared to the healthy 
control group, depressed participants‘ levels of trait-rumination also had an influence on their 
perseverative behaviours, possibly via its effects on moods and stop-rule use.  
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Further testing helped to clarify these results as depressed participants reported a biased 
tendency to naturally use the AMAC stop-rule to deal with negative emotions in their everyday 
life. Interestingly, analyses showed that depressive symptoms and metacognitive beliefs about 
the consequences of rumination, but not trait-rumination, independently predicted natural use of 
stop-rule. The interrelations between depressive symptoms, metacognitive beliefs, stop-rule use 
and trait-rumination were considered within the meta-cognitive model of depression and 
rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), which provided an explanatory framework.  
Finally, this study examined the participants‘ mood changes over the rumination interview and 
showed that depressed participants experienced significantly greater increases in negative 
mood (sadness and anxiety) than healthy controls, regardless of their stop-rule use. This finding 
warrants further investigation on the variables within the mood-as-input model, such as shifting 
of stop-rule within the rumination task, or other factors such as cognitive biases, that affect 
emotion states in rumination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
References 
Alloy, L.B., Abramson, L.Y., Hogan, M.E., Whitehouse,W.G., Rose, D.T., Robinson, M.S., 
Kim, R.S. and Lapkin, J.B. (2000) The Temple-Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to 
Depression Project: Lifetime history of Axis I psychopathology in individuals at high and low 
cognitive risk for depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 1109, 403-418         
Ashby, J., Rice, K., & Martin, J. (2006). Perfectionism, shame, and depressive symptoms. 
Journal of Counseling & Development, 84, 148-156.  
 
Beck, R. & Perkins, T.S. (2001). Cognitive content-specificity for anxiety and depression: A 
meta-analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 25, 651-663 
Blatt, S., Quinlan, D., Pilkonis, P., & Shea, M. (1995). Impact of perfectionism and need for 
approval on the brief treatment of depression: The national institute of mental health 
treatment of depression collaborative research program revisited. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 63(1), 125-132.  
 
Conway, M., Csank, P.A.R., Holm, S.L. and Blake, C.K. (2000) On assessing individual 
differences in rumination on sadness. Journal of Personality Assessment 775, 404-425. 
Davey, G. C. L., Startup, H. M., MacDonald, C. B., Jenkins, D., & Patterson, K. (2005). The 
use of "as many as can" versus "feel like continuing" stop rules during worrying. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 29(2), 155-169. 
Davey, G. C. L., Eldridge, F., Drost, Jolijn, & MacDonald, B. (2007). What ends a worry 
bout? An analysis of changes in mood and stop rule use across the catastrophising interview 
104 
 
task. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1375-1384. 
Davey G. C. L. (2006a). A mood-as-input account of perseverative worrying. In G. C. L. 
Davey & A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and 
treatment. Chichester: Wiley. 
Davey, G. C. L., Eldridge, F., Drost, Jolijn, & MacDonald, B. (2007). What ends a worry 
bout? An analysis of changes in mood and stop rule use across the catastrophising interview 
task. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1375-1384. 
Davey G.C.L., Startup H.M., MacDonald C.B., Jenkins D. & Patterson K. (2005) The use of 
'as many as can' stop rules during worrying. Cognitive Therapy & Research, 29, 155-169. 
 
          Deveney, C.M., & Deldin, P.J. (2006). A preliminary study of cognitive flexibility foremotional 
information in major depressive disorder and non-psychiatric controls. Emotion, 6, 429-437. 
 
Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Clara, I. P. (2000). The parental bonding instrument: conﬁrmatory 
evidence for a three- factor model in a psychiatric clinical sample and in the National 
Comorbidity Survey. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 35, 353–357. 
First MB,; Spitzer RL,; Gibbon M,; Williams JBW. (1996) Structured clinical interview for 
DSM-IV axis I disorders (American Psychiatric Association) 
Flett, G., & Hewitt, P. (2002) Perfectionism Theory, Research, and Treatment, American 
Psychological Association, Washington DC, USA. 
Fresco, D. M., Frankel, A., Mennin, D. S., Turk, C. L., & Heimberg, R. G. (2002). Distinct and 
overlapping features of rumination and worry:  The relationship of cognitive production to 
105 
 
negative affective states. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 179-188. 
Hawksley, J., & Davey, G. C. L. (2010). Mood-as-input and depressive rumination. 
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 48, 134-140. 
Hewitt, P. L., & Flett, G. L. (1991). Perfectionism in the self and social contexts: 
Conceptualization, assessment, and association with psychopathology. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 60(3), 456-470. 
Jones, N. P., Siegle, G. J., & Thase, M. E. (2008). Effects of rumination and initial severity 
on remission to cognitive therapy for depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32, 591–
604. 
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I.H. (2008). Updating the contents of working memory in depression: 
Interference from irrelevant negative material. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 278-
288 
Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, Williams JB. (2001) The PHQ-9: validity of a brief depression 
severity measure. J Gen Intern Med.;16(9):606-13. 
Kroenke, K.; Spitzer, R.L.; Williams, J.B.W.; Monahan, P.O.; Lowe, B. (2007). Anxiety 
disorders in primary care: Prevalence, impairment, comorbidity, and and detection. Ann 
Intern Med. 2007;146(5):317–325.  
Lavender, A., & Watkins, E. (2004). Rumination and  future thinking in depression. British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43, 129-142. 
Lo, C. S. L., Ho, S. M. Y., & Hollon, S. D. (2008). The effects of rumination and negative 
cognitive style on depression: A mediation analysis Behavior Research and Therapy 46, 
106 
 
487-495. 
Luminet, O. (2004). Assessment and measurement of rumination. In C. Papageorgiou and 
A. Wells (Eds.), Rumination: Nature, theory and treatment of negative thinking in depression. 
Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Tkach, C. (2004). The consequences of dysphoric rumination. In C. 
Papageorgiou & A. Wells (Eds.), Rumination: Nature, theory, and treatment of negative 
thinking in depression (pp. 21-41). Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Martin, L. L., & Davies, B. (1998). Beyond hedonism and associationism: A configural view 
of the role of affect in evaluation, processing, and self- regulation. Motivation and Emotion, 
22, 33-51. 
Martin, L. L. (1999). Moods do not convey information: Moods in context do. In J. P. Forgas 
(Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Martin, L. L., Ward, D. W., Achee, J. W., & Wyer, R. S. (1993). Mood as input: People have 
to interpret the motivational implications of their moods. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 64(3), 317-326. 
Martin, L. L., Shrira, L. & Startup, H. M. (2004). Rumination as a function of goal progress, 
stop rules and cerebral lateralization.In C. Papageorgiou and A. Wells (Eds.), Rumination: 
Nature, theory and treatment of negative thinking in depression. Chichester, England: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
107 
 
Martin, L.L., Strack, F., & Stapel, D.A. (2001). What's on our mind and how did it get there? 
The role of knowledge accessibility in social psychological phenomena. In A. Tesser & N. 
Schwarz (Eds.), Intraindividual processes (pp. 236-256). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
(Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology 
Martin, L. L., Tesser, A., & McIntosh, W. D. (1993). Wanting but not having: The effects of 
unattained goals on thoughts and feelings. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), 
Handbook of mental control (pp. 552-572). 
Matthews, G. & Wells, A. (1996) Attentional Processes, Dysfunctional Coping, and Clinical 
Intervention. In: M. Zeidner & N. Endler (eds. Handbook of Coping: Theory, Research and 
Applications. Wiley. 
Matthews, G. & Wells, A. (2004). Rumination, depression and metacognition: The S-REF 
model. In: C. Papageorgiou & A. Wells (Eds.). Depressive Rumination: Nature, Theory and 
Treatment. Chichester, UK: Wiley 
Moberly, N., & Watkins, E. (2008). Ruminative self-focus and negative affect: An experience 
sampling study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117(2), 314−323. 
Moberly, N.J., Watkins, E.R. (2010). Negative affect and ruminative self-focus during 
everyday goal pursuit. Cogn Emot, 24(4), 729-739 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster:  The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 115-121 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S.(1991)Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of 
108 
 
depressive episodes, Journal of Abnormal Psychology 100 (4), pp. 569–582 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed 
anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 504-511. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B. E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking 
rumination.Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3,400−424. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Jackson, B. (2001). Mediators of the gender difference in   
rumination. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 25, 37-47 
Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2001a). Metacognitive beliefs about rumination in recurrent 
major depression. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 8,160−164 
Papageorgiou C, Wells A. (2001b). Positive beliefs about depressive rumination: 
Development and preliminary validation of a self-report scale. Behavior Therapy, 32, 13-26. 
Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2003). An empirical test of a clinical metacognitive model  
of rumination and depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 261-273.   
Pearson, M., Brewin, C. R., Rhodes, J., & McCarron, G. (2008). Frequency and nature of 
rumination in chronic depression: A preliminary study. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 37:160 
Reynolds, M., & Salkovskis, P.M. (1992). Comparison of positive and negative intrusive 
thoughts and experimental investigation of the differential effects of mood. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 30, 273–281. 
Rimes, K & Watkins, E. (2005) The effects of self-focused rumination on global negative self-
judgments in depression, Behaviour Research and Therapy 43, pp. 1673–1681 
Robinson, M., S., &  Alloy L., B. (2003). Negative cognitive styles and stress-reactive 
109 
 
rumination interact to predict depression: a prospective study. Cognitive Theory and 
Research. 27:275–92 
 
Rood, L., Roelofs, J., Bögels, S. M., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schouten, E. (2009). The 
influence of rumination on depressive symptoms in youth: a meta-analytic review. Clinical 
Psychology Review.  
 
Segerstrom, S.C., Tsao, J.C.I., Alden, L.E., & Craske, M.G. (2000). Worry and rumination: 
Repetitive thought as a concomitant and predictor of negative mood. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research. 24, 671-688 
Shafran R., & Mansell W. (2001). Perfectionism and psychopathology: a review of research 
and treatment. Clin Psychol Rev, 21( 6), 879-906. 
Siegle, G. J., Sagrati, S., & Crawford, C. E. (1999). Effects of rumination and initial severity 
on response to cognitive therapy for depression. Paper presented at the 33rd Annual 
Convention of the Asscociation for the advancement of Behavior Therapy. 
Smith, J., M. &  Alloy, L., B. (2009). A roadmap to rumination: A review of the definition, 
assessment, and conceptualization of this multifaceted construct. Clinical Psychology 
Review 29: 116-128. 
Spasojevic, J., & Alloy, L. B. (2001). Rumination as a common mechanism relating 
depressive risk factors to depression. Emotion, 1(1), 25–37. 
Spitzer, R., Kroenke, K., Williams, J. & Lowe. (2006) The GAD 7. A brief measure for 
assessing generalised anxiety disorder. Archives Internal Medicine. 166, 1092. 
110 
 
Startup, H. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (2001). Mood as input and catastrophic worrying. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 110(1), 83-96. 
Startup, H. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (2003). Inflated responsibility and the use of stop rules for 
catastrophic worrying. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(4), 495-503. 
Stöber, J., & Borkovec, T. D. (2002). Reduced concreteness of worry in generalized anxiety 
disorder: Findings from a therapy study. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 89-96 
Thomsen, D. K. (2006). The association between rumination and negative affect: A review. 
Cognition & Emotion, 20, 1216-1235. 
Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination reconsidered: A 
psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247-259. 
Vasey, M. W., & Borkovec, T. D. (1992). A catastrophising assessment of worrisome 
thoughts. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16, 505-520. 
Watkins, E., & Baracaia, S. (2002). Rumination and social problem-solving in 
depression.Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40,1179−1189 
Watkins, E., & Brown, R. G. (2002). Rumination and executive function in depression: 
Anexperimental study. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 72, 400-402 
Watkins, E., & Moulds, M.L. (2007). Reduced concreteness of rumination in depression: A 
pilot study. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1386-1935 
Watkins, E., & Mason, A. (2002). Mood as input and rumination. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 32, 577-587. 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 3: CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
Introduction 
 
This critical appraisal begins with a reflection on the process behind the current study‘s 
conception. This is followed by further discussion on the recruitment process, methodological 
limitations of the study, and the clinical implications of the results. It is hoped that this reflection 
process might offer some insights into my motivation for undertaking this study and the 
rationales for the important decisions made along the way. It may also offer some useful ideas 
for future research on the mood-as-input model for depressive rumination. 
 
 
Motivation for the research 
 
The conception of the current research stemmed from my keen interest in working with patients 
with major depressive disorder. My fascination started, perhaps, at my initial contact with a 
depressed patient while working as a first-year trainee clinical psychologist in an outpatient 
psychology service. Withdrawn, uncontrollably sad, and in despair - this person who had 
struggled with recurrent depressive episodes for the previous 14 years and was referred as 
‗medication-refractory‘, I had come to realise, aptly summarised the most common experiences 
of this debilitating condition.  
Although advancements in cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) in the past two decades have 
effectively augmented the traditional antidepressant medication treatment  (see Churchill et al., 
2001; Christensen, Griffiths, Mackinnon & Brittliffe, 2006), studies have continued to show 
depression to be characterised by chronicity and  high relapse rates (e.g. Paykel et al., 2005). In 
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addition, risk of relapse was shown to be significantly predicted by the number of previous 
depressive episodes (Kessing, Hansen, Andersen & Angst, 2004). This suggested that existing 
treatments had been more successful in reducing symptoms than hindering the progressive 
course of the disorder.  
Consistent with clinical observations, research on factors that increase vulnerability to relapse 
has reported that patients recovered from depression often suffer from residual symptoms (Judd, 
1997; Judd et al., 1999; Paykel et al., 1995). A recent clinical case series demonstrated that 
CBT modified to target depressive rumination significantly improved symptoms of patients with 
residual depression (Watkins et al., 2007). These preliminary findings confirmed existing 
evidence on the effects of rumination on remission, and thus its central role in chronic 
depression (e.g. Jones, Siegle & Thase, 2008). Although the results from this preliminary study 
were encouraging and warrant further research, current research effort on treatment for 
rumination is admittedly scarce. This might partly be due to the absence of a general consensus 
on the conceptualisation of rumination (see Smith & Alloy, 2009), and a consequent lack of 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying its influence on depressive symptoms.  
I was also repeatedly struck by rumination‘s predominance as a thinking style amongst patients 
who had lived with their depressive symptoms for years. This seeming incongruence between 
my clinical observations and the then current state of research motivated me to embark on a 
search in the existing literature for theories of rumination. In particular, I focussed on looking for 
theoretical models containing operationalised constructs that could lend themselves to empirical 
testing. It was this search that brought my attention to the mood-as-input studies on 
perseverative worry and rumination. 
When this project began in early 2010, there were two published experimental studies 
examining the mood-as-input hypothesis of rumination (Watkins & Mason, 2002; Hawksley & 
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Davey, 2010). Due to the small amount of available data, and as none of these studies included 
participants from a clinical population, there appeared to be a need for a study on rumination 
from a mood-as-input perspective with a clinical sample with depression. 
 
 
Recruitment of clinical participants  
 
In retrospect, one of the most time-consuming and labour-intensive parts of the study was the 
recruitment of clinical participants from mental health services. The 25 depressed participants in 
this study were all recruited from NHS outpatient psychology services via clinician referrals. 
Notwithstanding the relatively high availability of patients with depression compared to other 
conditions, the recruitment process lasted for 9 months and involved 4 Improved Access to 
Psychological Therapy (IAPT) services within a London NHS Foundation Trust.  
The rationale for this referral procedure was that it would protect the participants‘ confidentiality 
by limiting my access to their personal details pre-study. It was also meant to provide a least 
intrusive route to recruitment, as clinicians were required to obtain potential participants‘ verbal 
consents before I approached them about the research. Although this procedure safeguarded 
the ethical integrity of the study‘s recruitment process, it proved to be logistically inefficient. In 
hindsight, this may be explained by a number of reasons. First of all, most psychology services 
were under considerable demands for research opportunities with their patients. For this reason, 
at any given time most clinicians often had more than one project that they had agreed to 
introduce to their patients. Therefore, practically, it was difficult for them to commit to offer 
continuous help with my research.  
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Secondly, it was noted that patients seldom made immediate decisions about participation once 
they had been introduced to the study. This is understandable, given the commitment the study 
required of them. This might have been compounded by the lowered level of motivation related 
to their depression.  As potential participants could only contact me or be approached after 
discussing their intention to take part with their clinicians (who they usually saw once a week), it 
took an average of at least 2 to 3 weeks for me to be informed after they had expressed initial 
interest in taking part. Thirdly, most participants let me know they were only willing to take part 
in the study if the research session took place in their local psychology service. Due to the 
consistently high demand on clinical space in these services and their standardised working 
hours, this common request placed a considerable limitation on my ability to carry out my testing 
efficiently. 
On reflection, it seems that some of these practical difficulties could have been solved by 
adopting alternative recruitment strategies, without risking the patients‘ confidentiality or 
increasing the level of intrusiveness. One way may be to use recruitment posters. Potential 
participants may learn about the study and make independent decisions about taking part from 
an information sheet or a poster displayed at psychology services. They may then initiate 
contact with the researcher in private. 
On a management level, psychology services may help facilitate research in general by 
introducing a generic statement about providing consent for potential contacts from researchers 
as part of their patients‘ initial assessment documents. This way, clinicians would not need to 
obtain consent from their patients for each new research project, and may make direct referrals 
of suitable patients to researchers, thus saving much time on logistics. 
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Conception of the study design 
 
The recruitment of clinical participants was also one of my main concerns in designing the study. 
As the primary aim of the current study was to compare predictions of the mood-as-input 
hypothesis about a clinical population with non-clinical controls, the group sampling method was 
by default non-random. Without the benefits of group randomisation, this design potentially 
opened the test results to influences of pre-test, between-group variations in the participants‘ 
characteristics. For this reason, certain measures were adopted to minimise data contamination 
by these factors.  
First, all participants in the control group were matched with the depressed participants in terms 
of demographic factors that were found to be related to the clinical characteristics of chronic 
depression, i.e. age, gender, and educational background (Kocsis, Voss, Mann & Frances, 
1986). In addition, the design also incorporated a within-subject element. In order to mitigate the 
effect of individual differences in factors known to be influential on perseverative thinking, such 
as cognitive deficits related to depression (see Gotlib & Joorman, 2010), participants were 
asked to undertake the rumination interview in both stop-rule conditions. For this reason, the 
study adopted a mixed between-subject, repeated-measure design. 
Because of the part repeated-measure design, the sample sizes of each participant group were 
not further divided into separate stop-rule conditions. This had the benefit of reducing the 
demand for a bigger sample by preserving the power of the statistical analyses. Therefore, this 
design had proven to be economical, considering the difficulties involved in recruiting 
participants from a clinical population as described above. 
While planning the study, I was also mindful that the influences of other confounding factors that 
were not reflected in pre-test measurement might be present, such as carryover effect.. In other 
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words, when participants undertook both conditions of the rumination interview within the same 
research session, the effects of the first condition might remain and affect the outcomes of the 
second condition. As rumination has consistently been demonstrated to be related to negative 
affects (Thomsen, 2006), one of the most obvious which participants might carry over to the 
second part of the interview was a lasting effect of the interview on their mood states. To 
minimise this problem, the orders of the two experimental conditions were counterbalanced for 
all participants.  
 
Considerations on the neutral mood induction procedures 
 
In addition, the study also introduced a neutral mood induction procedure (presented to the 
participants as a relaxation exercise) between the two conditions of the interview, with a view to 
cancelling out the mood effects of the first condition. Principles of the mood-induction procedure 
used in a previous mood-in-input study were adopted for this purpose (see Hawksley & Davey, 
2010). To induce a neutral mood, participants were asked to listen to a 5-minute piece of mood-
suggestive music (Chopin‘s Waltz in C minor) alone in the intermission between the two 
experimental conditions. Overall, the procedure was successful.  Results of analyses of the 
outcomes of mood assessment using visual analogue scales (VAS) showed that participants‘ 
mood ratings after the relaxation exercise were approximately restored to their pre-interview 
levels.  
However, a few shortcomings of these methods were noted in the administration process. First, 
there was considerable variability in the participants‘ responses to the music. Effects opposite to 
the desired mood states were reported by two participants, who became slightly distressed by 
the music as it evoked negative thoughts and memories. Secondly, a survey of the literature on 
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studies which conducted mood-inductions through music revealed that music alone might not 
automatically induce the intended mood state (see Martin, 1990). Because of this, in addition to 
listening to the music passively, some of those studied also instructed their participants to use 
any other means appropriate to get into the target mood states. To enhance the effectiveness of 
the mood induction for the purpose of the current study, introducing an element of attentional 
training to help engage with the procedure might have been a helpful modification. Past studies 
have shown that deliberate disengagement of one‘s attention from stressful cognitions or 
internal stimuli produced improvement in moods (e.g. Wells, 1990; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner & 
Timpano, 2009). Therefore, future studies may ask participants to intentionally disengage their 
attention from their internal thoughts, and direct their attention on external stimuli - the music - 
during the mood induction task. Based on previous findings of the impact of attentional control 
on mood states, it is reasonable to expect that this instruction will increase the effectiveness of a 
mood-induction procedure. 
A further issue is that the outcomes of the neutral mood induction procedures might have been 
subject to demand effects. This suggests the possibility that changes in participants‘ mood 
states were artificial due to their propensity to comply with experimental demands. The study 
design and my research resources did not allow such effects to be easily monitored. However, 
past studies which investigated the efficacy of mood induction by music had examined a 
number of mood effects which participants are not likely to simulate, such as changes in 
performances of motor-tasks and skin conductance reactivity (e.g. Clark &  Teasdale, 1985; 
Sutton, 1985). In general, these studies have demonstrated that these measurements tend to 
be sensitive to music induction. Therefore, though difficult to confirm, the influence of demand 
effects in the present study was unlikely to be significant.  
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Reflections on the rumination interview paradigm 
 
Background of the rumination interview task 
The current study used the rumination interview task as its dependent measure, which was 
originally an adaptation of the catastrophising interview procedure developed and used to 
measure perseverative worrying in past studies (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992; Startup & Davey, 
2001; Davey, 2006). The rumination interview in the present study involved asking participants 
to think of a recent, upsetting incident in each of the two parts of the task. They were then asked 
a series of standardised questions about why the incident made them feel upset. Each 
participant undertook both parts of the interview, in each of which they were asked to follow 
either an ‗as-much-as-can‘ (AMAC) or ‗feeling like continuing‘ (FLC) stop-rule, i.e. to answer as 
much as they can, or to stop answering the questions when they did not feel like continuing, 
respectively. 
This interview task was chosen as the experimental paradigm of this study for several reasons. 
First, the paradigm provided an objective and controlled manipulation of the variables predicted 
by the mood-as-input theory to contribute to the persistence of perseverative thinking, i.e. stop-
rules and mood states. Secondly, it allowed for the quantification, and hence the objective 
measurement, of a bout of perseverative rumination by converting progression into the 
incremental number of questions answered (or ‗steps‘ emitted) by the interviewee (participant). 
Lastly, variants of the interview task had been used in a number of prior studies, where they 
demonstrated sensitivity to the variables predicted by the mood-as-input hypothesis to influence 
the strength and frequency of perseverative thinking (e.g. Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003; Davey, 
Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Paterson, 2005; Davey, Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007; 
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Hawksley & Davey, 2010). This suggested that the rumination interview task was a valid 
analogue of naturally occurring rumination. 
 
Potential limitations of the paradigm 
Despite its advantages and evidence in support of its validity as a measure of rumination, 
however, I have made a number of observations which might have implications for refinement or 
modification of the paradigm for future applications. First, although the majority of depressed 
participants experienced increases in negative mood over the course of their interviews, a 
minority of them (i.e. 2 depressed participants using the AMAC and 3 using the FLC stop-rules) 
reported improvement (decreases in their sadness) in their mood-states post-interview. This 
observation warrants comment, as it contradicted the expected results based on the well-
researched connection between rumination in depression and negative affects (see Thomsen, 
2006). One potentially related issue is that this study did not distinguish between the negative 
and positive aspects of the ruminative sequence in the analyses (Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003; Watkins, 2008). It was therefore possible that for some of the participants 
perseveration during the rumination task might have represented adaptive reflection. This 
highlights the fact that although the mood-as-input hypothesis predicts the variables which 
influence perseveration, it does not provide an explanation of what determines whether an 
individual could benefit from a period of rumination. In order to investigate factors which affect 
the subjective experience of rumination, future studies may examine and compare the themes 
from the contents of the rumination sequences produced by participants who experience 
improvement with those who experience deterioration in moods during the rumination task.  
Another possibility may be related to the interpersonal format of the rumination task. As 
mentioned in the discussion section in the empirical paper of the current study, the interaction 
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during the interview between myself, the researcher, and the depressed participant might have 
given rise to experiences which were not a part of naturally occurring rumination. This study did 
not formally document the participants‘ feedback on how they decided to terminate each part of 
the rumination interview. However, anecdotal reports suggested that some participants felt that 
the opportunity to talk about their negative experience provided some forms of emotional relief. 
This may be accounted for by the effect of my presence, and my appearance to listen non-
judgementally, experienced by a participant in distress during the interview. Although I took care 
to adhere to the standardised procedure of the interview task, which is designed to minimise 
individual differences of questioning style by researchers and the effects of some of these 
interpersonal elements, the interactional experience of the interview might unintentionally 
resemble some of the common factors of psychological therapy enlisted by Imel and Wampold 
(2008). 
Another relevant observation I made pertains to the effectiveness of the current definitions and 
presentation of stop-rules for participants adopted by the rumination task. Whilst conducting the 
rumination interview, I noticed a recurrent problem many participants encountered with adhering 
to the stop-rule instructions, especially with the FLC stop-rule. The FLC stop-rule was devised 
and used by Martin, Ward, Achee and Wyer (1993) in their original mood-as-input study. It may 
be understood as an experimental instruction aimed to replicate an experientially-focussed (as 
opposed to analytically-focussed) thinking style (Watkins & Teesdale, 2001, 2004), which asks a 
person to continue with their current task as long as they enjoy it (or feel like continuing). To 
achieve this, a question is presented to each participant, for them to set a goal for the task by 
asking themselves, ‘Do I feel like I want to continue thinking of the reasons that make me feel 
sad?’ Participants were asked to stop the interview when they no longer enjoyed participating in 
it. 
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However, I noticed that a considerable proportion of participants perseverated under the FLC 
condition. This phenomenon may reflect participants‘ misunderstanding of the instructions. For 
example, two participants remarked after the experiment that ‘I feel like continuing because I 
haven’t thought this through fully yet and so should continue’. In these cases, it shows that 
these participants referred back to the AMAC stop-rule in the FLC condition. Considering 
depressed participants showed a preference to adopt a default AMAC stop-rule, it is possible 
that this phenomenon is particularly common among depressed participants. 
Another possibility which may explain this observation is, as mentioned above, the adaptive 
aspect of rumination (e.g. reflection). Participants who perseverated might have genuinely felt 
like continuing, as the rumination task offered them emotional reliefs or had a cathartic effect. 
To improve the validity of the FLC stop-rule instruction, and direct participants‘ attention to their 
feelings, I suggest a method that uses a concrete description of the thinking style asked of them 
by linking the FLC stop-rules explicitly to an overall feeling of discomfort or distress. For 
example, it may be rephrased as, ‗stop if you‘re becoming distressed or uncomfortable about 
the process‘. 
 
 
Clinical implications 
 
The present study confirmed findings from previous research, which suggested that rumination 
is a significant factor for the persistence of depression (see Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). It also 
supported the mood-as-input prediction of the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the 
persistence of rumination in people with clinical depression.  
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Until recently, the predominant models of CBT for depression had not explicitly addressed 
rumination. This perhaps reflects the emphasis of traditional cognitive models of depression (e.g. 
Clark & Beck, 1999) on the contents of maladaptive thinking rather than mental processes (see 
Hollon, Thase, & Markowitz, 2002). A recent case series reported by Watkins et al. (2007) 
offered some preliminary evidence for the efficacy of targeting patients‘ ruminative thinking in 
treatment for chronic and recurrent depression. In this case series, the rumination-focussed 
model was documented to have focussed on switching depressed patients‘ maladaptive to more 
helpful thinking styles through the use of functional analyses, imagery exercises, and 
behavioural experiments. As a result, the participants reported significant remissions of residual 
symptoms including depressive rumination.  
Given that the results of the present study showed a significant effect of explicit stop-rule 
manipulations on the degrees of perseverative rumination amongst individuals with depression, 
elements of the rumination interview paradigm may be eligible for clinical use. Specifically, 
depressive patients might benefit from in-therapy training on conceptualising ruminative thinking 
style in terms of the AMAC stop-rule, and the conscious use of FLC stop-rule as a coping 
strategy to disengage themselves from prolonged perseveration.  
These methods have a number of potential advantages. First, the rationale for an intervention 
targeting stop-rule use is based on a cognitive model consisted of factors that contribute directly 
to iterative thinking styles; therefore, and as empirical evidence has suggested, it is likely to 
produce a shift in the patients‘ thinking style within a short time. In addition, depression is known 
to be associated with an abstract and analytical thinking style (see Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). 
Therefore, the understanding of rumination in terms of stop-rule may provide a concrete and 
experiential definition of rumination. Hence, it might help individuals with depression more easily 
grapple with their experiences of ruminative thinking in their day-to-day dealings with depressive 
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symptoms. For these reasons, I believe that the principles of the rumination interview paradigm 
can offer valuable ideas of treatment methods that may prove to be effective adjuncts to the 
existing model of rumination-focussed CBT. 
 
Conclusion 
 
On reflection, undertaking this research project has been a challenging yet productive learning 
process for me. It has broadened my knowledge on the field of depression studies, as well as 
helped me develop in my journey of maturation as a scientist-practitioner. This applies in 
particular to methodological considerations in designing a study, and my understanding of the 
significant differences in practice subtle decisions can make, such as decisions on recruitment 
and measures to protect the validity of experimental paradigms. Besides the opportunity to 
conduct research in an area I find passion in, I also feel that this project has been a worthwhile 
endeavour due to its findings‘ implications for future rumination studies and clinical research. 
Overall, I believe this study has reinforced the mood-as-input theory. It has also been successful 
in providing preliminary evidence for the mechanisms underlying perseverative rumination in 
people with depression.  
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
References  
 
Christensen H, Griffiths KM, Mackinnon AJ, & Brittliffe K. (2006). Online randomized 
controlled trial of brief and full cognitive behaviour therapy for depression. 
Churchill R, Hunot V, Corney R, Knapp M, McGuire H, Tylee A, Wessely S. (2001). A 
systematic review of controlled trials of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of brief 
psychological treatments for depression. Health Technology Assessment, 5, 1 –173.  
 
Clark, D. M., & Teasdale, J. D. (1985). Constraints of the effects of mood on memory. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1595–1608. 
Clark, D.A. and A.T. Beck (1999) Scientific Foundations of Cognitive Theory and Therapy of 
Depression. New York: John Wiley 
Davey G. C. L. (2006a). A mood-as-input account of perseverative worrying. In G. C. L. 
Davey & A. Wells (Eds.), Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and 
treatment. Chichester: Wiley. 
Davey, G. C. L., Eldridge, F., Drost, Jolijn, & MacDonald, B. (2007). What ends a worry 
bout? An analysis of changes in mood and stop rule use across the catastrophising interview 
task. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1375-1384. 
Davey G.C.L., Startup H.M., MacDonald C.B., Jenkins D. & Patterson K. (2005) The use of 
'as many as can' stop rules during worrying. Cognitive Therapy & Research, 29, 155-169. 
Gotlib, I.H., & Joormann, J. (2010). Cognition and depression: Current status and future 
126 
 
directions. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 
Hawksley, J., & Davey, G. C. L. (2010). Mood-as-input and depressive rumination. 
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 48, 134-140. 
Hollon, S. D., Thase, M. E., & Markowitz, J. C. (2002). Treatment and prevention of 
depression. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 3, 39-77 
Imel,Z., & Wampold, B. (2008). The Importance of Treatment and the Science of Common 
Factors in Psychotherapy. Handbook of counseling Psychology, (4th ed.). (pp. 249-262): 
John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Jones, N. P., Siegle, G. J., & Thase, M. E. (2008). Effects of rumination and initial severity 
on remission to cognitive therapy for depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32, 591–
604. 
 Joormann, J. &. Gotlib, I.H (2010). Cognition and depression: Current status and future 
directions. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 
Judd, L. L., Paulus, M. P., Zeller, P., Fava, G. A., Rafanelli, C., Grandi, S., et al. (1999). The 
role of residual subthreshold depressive symptoms in early episode relapse in unipolar 
subthreshold depressive symptoms in early episode relapse in unipolar depressive disorder. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 56, 764–765. 
Judd, L. L. (1997). The clinical course of unipolar major depressive disorders. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 54, 989–991. 
Kessing, LV, Hansen, MG, Andersen, PK, Angst, J (2004). Recurrence of bipolar disorders 
and major depression: a life-long perspective. Acta Psych. Scand.109, 339-344 
127 
 
Kocsis, J.H., Voss, C., Mann, J.J. and Frances, A. 1986. Chronic depression: Demographic 
and clinical characteristics. Psychopharm. Bull. 22(1):192-l95 
Martin, M., (1990). On the induction of mood. Clinical Psychology Review 10, pp. 669–697 
Martin, L. L., Ward, D. W., Achee, J. W., & Wyer, R. S. (1993). Mood as input: People have 
to interpret the motivational implications of their moods. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 64(3), 317-326. 
Paykel, E. S., Ramana, R., Cooper, Z., Hayhurst, H., Kerr, J., & Barocka, A. (1995).Residual 
symptoms after partial remission – an important outcome indepression. Psychological 
Medicine, 25, 1171–1180. 
Paykel E.S., Scott J., Cornwall P.L., Abbott R., Crane, C., Pope M. & Johnson A.L. (2005). 
Duration of relapse prevention after cognitive therapy in residual depression: follow-up of 
controlled trial. Psychological Medicine 35, 59-68 
Timpano KR, Buckner JD, Richey JA, Murphy DL, Schmidt NB (2009) Exploration of anxiety 
sensitivity and distress tolerance as vulnerability factors for hoarding behaviors. Depress 
Anxiety 26:343-53 
Smith, J., M. &  Alloy, L., B. (2009). A roadmap to rumination: A review of the definition, 
assessment, and conceptualization of this multifaceted construct. Clinical Psychology 
Review 29: 116-128. 
Spasojevic, J., & Alloy, L. B. (2001). Rumination as a common mechanism relating 
depressive risk factors to depression. Emotion, 1(1), 25–37. 
Startup, H. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (2001). Mood as input and catastrophic worrying. Journal 
128 
 
of Abnormal Psychology, 110(1), 83-96. 
Startup, H. M., & Davey, G. C. L. (2003). Inflated responsibility and the use of stop rules for 
catastrophic worrying. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(4), 495-503. 
Sutton, L (1985) , Effects of depressed mood on remembering and perceiving pleasant and 
unpleasant material. , University of Oxford, Oxford, England (1985) Unpublished master's 
thesis 
Thomsen, D. K. (2006). The association between rumination and negative affect: A review. 
Cognition & Emotion, 20, 1216-1235. 
 
Reynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination reconsidered: A 
psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247-259. 
Vasey, M. W., & Borkovec, T. D. (1992). A catastrophising assessment of worrisome 
thoughts. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16, 505-520. 
Watkins, E., & Mason, A. (2002). Mood as input and rumination. Personality and 
IndividualDifferences, 32, 577-587. 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2001). Rumination and overgeneral memory in 
depression:Effects of self-focus and analytic thinking. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 
353357. 
Watkins, E. & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 82, 1-8.  
Watkins, E., & Moulds, M.L. (2007). Reduced concreteness of rumination in depression: A 
129 
 
pilot study. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1386 
Watkins, E.R. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought. Psychol Bull, 
134(2), 163 
Wells, A. (1990). Panic disorder in association with relaxation induced anxiety: An attention 
training approach to treatment. Behavior Therapy, 21, 273-280. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Ethical approval letters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
 
Take out this page to insert letter page 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Take out this page to insert letter page 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
Take out this page to insert letter page 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Take out this page to insert letter page 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Take out this page to insert letter page 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Participant Information Sheet: For depressed participants 
Participant Information Sheet: For healthy volunteers 
Participant Consent Form: For depressed participants 
Participant Consent Form: For healthy volunteers 
GP information letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET (for depressed participants) 
 
STUDY TITLE:  A STUDY OF RUMINATION IN DEPRESSION 
 
Dear ……………………………………….., 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. 
Please let us know if you would like more information, and take time to decide whether you would like 
to participate or not. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
My name is Jason Chan and I am a second year Clinical Psychologist in training at the University College 
of London (UCL) and I am conducting this research project as part of the thesis of my doctoral degree. 
Rumination refers to a prolonged and repetitive style of thinking. People with low mood or those who 
suffer from depression often find themselves thinking on and on,  for a long period of time about what 
upset them, and why they are upset. 
I am currently exploring how rumination may maintain one’s symptoms of depression. In particular, my 
project will aim to find out whether rumination is connected with low mood, and whether such a 
connection (if there is one) differ between people with and without a current diagnosis of depression. I 
am hoping that this study will help mental health professionals gain a more in-depth understanding of 
the psychological factors that maintain depressive symptoms in some people, and generate knowledge 
that will inform the continuing development of psychological therapy for depression.  
 
Why have I been invited? 
Your name has been identified from the treatment list of one of the mental health services in the 
Camden and Islington Foundation Trust, and the result of your initial assessment suggested that you 
may be experiencing symptoms of depression. 
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And 
You have expressed an interest in my project and/ or given consent to be contacted about this project 
by telephone.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is wholly your choice as to whether you decide to participate or not. If you do decide to participate 
you will be asked to sign a form recording your consent. 
If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
 
What will happen if I take part?  
To participate, you would be asked to take part in one interview session lasting around 1½ hours in an 
outpatient mental health service clinic in Islington.  
The meeting will involve completing several questionnaire-based assessment, and taking part in an 
interview about your recent experience of depression by the researcher. Once the session finished, you 
will be given a full explanation of the background of the study and the purpose of the procedures. 
 
Payment and expenses 
You will be offered a £10 remuneration for compensation of the expenses (e.g. travel cost, time) 
incurred on you as a result of taking part in this study. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part in the study? 
It is fully acknowledged that telling your experience of depression may be a difficult process. Some 
questions I may ask you might feel sensitive. If any of the questions are found to be particularly 
upsetting you may choose not to continue the study.    
 
What are the possible benefits from taking part in the study? 
We can not promise that the study will help you. However, the interview-based experiment you will 
undertake, should you choose to part take in this project, have been reported by other studies to help 
people discover alternative, and sometimes more effective way of coping with their negative moods and 
other psychological distresses associated to rumination.  
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What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any problem you might 
experienced will be addressed. 
If you have any concern about any aspect of this study you should ask to speak to the researcher who 
will do his best to answer your questions (Telephone number: 07971184597). If you remain unhappy 
and wish to complain formally you can do so by contacting the project’s Research Supervisor, Professor 
Chris Brewin (Telephone number: 02076791897).  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information collected about you throughout the course of research will be kept strictly confidential. 
Your name and other identifying information will be kept securely and separately from the outcomes of 
your questionnaire-based assessments and interviews.  
Only anonymised data collected from your session will be looked at by representatives from academic 
and professional assessment bodies in order to assess the quality of this doctoral research project. All 
will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant.  
 
Are their any reasons where confidentiality may be breached? 
As all participants will be regulated by the Research Ethics Committee of the NHS North Central London 
Research Consortium (NoCLor) due to your professional status, the following code of conduct will be 
followed with regards to confidentiality: 
1. If you disclose information during the interview which leads to sufficient concern about 
your safety or the safety of others it may be judged necessary to inform an appropriate 
third party without formal consent. 
2. Prior to this occurrence the researcher’s project supervisor will be contacted to discuss 
any possible concerns, unless the delay would involve a significant risk to life or health.  
 
What will happen to the results of this research study? 
The results will be written up in the form of a thesis for the purposes of gaining a Doctoral qualification 
in Clinical Psychology.  
The findings may be shared via academic publication and/or presentations. Participants will not be 
identified in any report or publication.  
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Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent Research Ethics Committee to protect your safety, 
rights, dignity and well-being. This study has also been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by 
academic and clinical professionals in the University College of London (UCL) who has raised no 
objections on ethical grounds.  
 
Further information and contact details 
Should you have any further questions or any concerns during the study please do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher or his research supervisor on the contact numbers provided below. 
If you are interested in potentially participating in this study please fill in the reply slip included with this 
information sheet and return to Jason Chan (Primary Researcher) via the email address provided. 
Should you wish to complain about this study the Independent Complaints Advocacy Service (ICAS) 
supports individuals wishing to pursue a complaint about the NHS. (See http://www.dh.gov.uk)   
The contact details for the areas covered by this study are as follows: 
 ICAS North Central London Tel: 0845 120 3784  
 ICAS North East London Tel: 0845 337 3059  
 ICAS North West London Tel: 0845 337 3065  
 ICAS South East London Tel: 0845 337 3061  
 ICAS South West London Tel: 0845 337 3063 
 ICAS Surrey Tel: 0845 600 8616 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information. 
Kind Regards, 
 
Mr Jason Chan        
Chief Investigator 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist    
chee.shun.jason.chan@gmail.com  
Tel: 07971184597  
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Research Supervisors 
 
 
Professor Chris Brewin    Professor Graham Davey 
Research Supervisor     Research Supervisor 
Professor of Clinical Psychology   Professor of Psychology 
c.brewin@ucl.ac.uk     grahamda@sussex.ac.uk 
Tel: 0207 679 5927  Tel: 0127 367 8485 
 
 
Mr. Stuart Linke 
Site Supervisor 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
stuart.linke@candi.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0207 685 4700 
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INFORMATION SHEET (for healthy volunteers) 
 
STUDY TITLE:  A STUDY OF RUMINATION IN DEPRESSION 
Dear ……………………………………….., 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. 
Please let us know if you would like more information, and take time to decide whether you would like 
to participate or not. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
My name is Jason Chan and I am a second year Clinical Psychologist in training at University College of 
London (UCL). I am conducting this research project as part of the thesis of my doctoral degree. 
Rumination refers to a prolonged and repetitive style of thinking. People with low mood or those who 
suffer from depression often find themselves thinking on and on, for a long period of time about what 
upset them, and why they are upset. 
I am currently exploring how rumination may maintain one’s symptoms of depression. In particular, my 
project will aim to find out whether rumination is connected with low mood, and whether such a 
connection (if there is one) differs between people with and without a current diagnosis of depression. I 
am hoping that this study will help mental health professionals gain a more in-depth understanding of 
the psychological factors that maintain depressive symptoms in some people, and generate knowledge 
that will inform the continuing development of psychological therapy for depression.  
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Why have I been invited? 
You have been identified by the researcher as a suitable candidate for this study because your 
demographic details, including your age, gender and levels of education fulfil the requirement of the 
healthy sample population for this study.  
And 
You have been approached by the researcher and expressed an interest to participate. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is wholly your choice as to whether you decide to participate or not. If you do decide to participate 
you will be asked to sign a form recording your consent. 
If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
 
What will happen if I take part?  
To participate, you would be asked to take part in one interview session lasting around one hour in an 
outpatient mental health service clinic in Islington.  
The meeting will involve completing several questionnaire-based assessments, and taking part in an 
interview about your recent experience of depression by the researcher. Once the session finished, you 
will be given a full explanation of the background of the study and the purpose of the procedures. 
 
Payment and expenses 
You will be offered a £10 remuneration for compensation of the expenses (e.g. travel cost, time) 
incurred on you as a result of taking part in this study. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part in the study? 
It is fully acknowledged that talking about your experience of low mood may be a difficult process. Some 
questions I may ask you might feel sensitive. If any of the questions are found to be particularly 
upsetting you may choose not to continue the study.    
144 
 
 
What are the possible benefits from taking part in the study? 
The interview-based experiment you will undertake, should you choose to part take in this project, has 
been reported by other studies to help people discover alternative, and sometimes more effective way 
of coping with their negative moods and other psychological distresses associated to rumination.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any problem you might 
experience will be addressed. 
If you have any concern about any aspect of this study you should ask to speak to the researcher who 
will do his best to answer your questions (Telephone number: 07971184597). If you remain unhappy 
and wish to complain formally you can do so by contacting the project’s Research Supervisor, Professor 
Chris Brewin (Telephone number: 02076791897).  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information collected about you throughout the course of research will be kept strictly confidential. 
Your name and other identifying information will be kept securely and separately from the outcomes of 
your questionnaire-based assessments and interviews.  
Only anonymised data collected from your session will be looked at by representatives from academic 
and professional assessment bodies in order to assess the quality of this doctoral research project. All 
will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant.  
 
Are there any reasons where confidentiality may be breached? 
The following code of conduct will be followed with regards to confidentiality: 
 
3. If you disclose information during the interview which leads to sufficient concern about 
your safety or the safety of others it may be judged necessary to inform an appropriate 
third party without formal consent. 
4. Prior to this occurrence the researcher’s project supervisor will be contacted to discuss 
any possible concerns, unless the delay would involve a significant risk to life or health.  
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What will happen to the results of this research study? 
The results will be written up in the form of a thesis for the purposes of gaining a Doctoral qualification 
in Clinical Psychology.  
The findings may be shared via academic publication and/or presentations. Participants will not be 
identified in any report or publication.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent Research Ethics Committee to protect your safety, 
rights, dignity and well-being. This study has also been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by 
academic and clinical professionals in University College of London (UCL) who has raised no objections 
on ethical grounds.  
 
Further information and contact details 
Should you have any further questions or any concerns during the study please do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher or his research supervisor on the contact numbers provided below. 
If you are interested in potentially participating in this study please fill in the reply slip included with this 
information sheet and return to Jason Chan (Primary Researcher) via the email address provided. 
Should you wish to complain about this study the Independent Complaints Advocacy Service (ICAS) 
supports individuals wishing to pursue a complaint about the NHS. (See http://www.dh.gov.uk)   
The contact details for the areas covered by this study are as follows: 
 ICAS North Central London Tel: 0845 120 3784  
 ICAS North East London Tel: 0845 337 3059  
 ICAS North West London Tel: 0845 337 3065  
 ICAS South East London Tel: 0845 337 3061  
 ICAS South West London Tel: 0845 337 3063 
 ICAS Surrey Tel: 0845 600 8616 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information. 
 
Kind Regards, 
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Mr Jason Chan        
Chief Investigator 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist    
chee.shun.jason.chan@gmail.com  
Tel: 07971184597  
 
Research Supervisors 
 
 
Professor Chris Brewin     Professor Graham Davey 
Research Supervisor     Research Supervisor 
Professor of Clinical Psychology    Professor of Psychology 
c.brewin@ucl.ac.uk     grahamda@sussex.ac.uk 
Tel: 0207 679 5927  Tel: 0127 367 8485 
 
 
Mr. Stuart Linke 
Site Supervisor 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
stuart.linke@candi.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0207 685 4700 
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Title of Project: Study on Rumination in Depression  
Name of Researcher: Jason Chan 
Please tick  
to confirm  
  
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated 6
th
 April 2010 (version 1.0) for the above study.  
• 
  I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
• 
  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical 
care or legal rights being affected.  
• 
  
I understand that relevant sections of any of my medical notes and data 
collected during the study, may be looked at by responsible individuals 
from University College London, from regulatory authorities or from the 
NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to my records.  
• 
  I agree to my GP being informed of my participation in the study. • 
  I agree to take part in the above research study.  • 
 
__________________________ 
Name of Participant 
______________ 
Date 
__________________________ 
Signature 
__________ 
Name of Person taking consent  
(if different from researcher) 
______________ 
Date 
__________________________ 
Signature 
__________________________ 
Researcher 
______________ 
Date 
__________________________ 
Signature 
When complete, 1 copy for participant: 1 copy for researcher site file: 1 (original) to be kept in medical 
notes. 
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Consent Form (for healthy volunteers) 
Title of Project: Study on Rumination in Depression  
Name of Researcher: Jason Chan 
Please tick  
to confirm  
  
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 25
th
 
June 2010 (version 2.0) for the above study.  
• 
  
 
I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.  
• 
  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal 
rights being affected.  
• 
  I agree to take part in the above research study.  • 
 
  
 
  
 
__________________________ 
Name of Participant 
______________ 
Date 
__________________________ 
Signature 
__________ 
Name of Person taking consent  
(if different from researcher) 
______________ 
Date 
__________________________ 
Signature 
__________________________ 
Researcher 
______________ 
Date 
__________________________ 
Signature 
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Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
University College London 
4th Floor, 1-19 Torrington Place 
London 
WC1E 7HB 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 1897 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7916 1989 
GP surgery address 
--/--/-- 
Dear Dr. 
Re: Patient name 
Date of birth:  
I am writing to inform you that your patient named above has consented to participate in a 
research study examining the relationship between rumination and his/her depressive 
symptoms. He/she will be ask to attend one 60-minute appointment at his/her local 
psychological therapy clinic. During the appointment, he/she will be asked to complete 4 
questionnaires and take part in a structured interview about a recent experience of low mood 
which may last up to 30 minutes. 
This study has received approval from the North London Research Ethics Committee as 
ethnically sound. Risk to the patient from his/her participation in this study was assessed prior to 
the study, and no risk to the patient‘s well-being was determined. 
If you would like any further information about this study, please contact me using the 
details above.     
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Jason Chan 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust 
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The Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale 
The Negative Beliefs about Rumination Scale 
The Ruminative Responses Scale 
The Visual Analogue Mood (VAS) Scales 
Rumination Interview Stop-rule Instruction: As-much-as much stop-rule 
Rumination Interview Stop-rule Instruction: Feel-like-continuing stop-rule 
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POSITIVE BELIEFS ABOUT RUMINATION SCALE (PBRS) 
Developed by Costas Papageorgiou and Adrian Wells 
 
Instructions: Most people experience depressive thoughts at times. When depressive thinking is 
prolonged and repetitive it is called rumination. This questionnaire is concerned about the beliefs that 
people have about rumination. Listed below are a number of these beliefs. Please read each belief 
carefully and indicate how much you generally agree with each one. Please circle the number that best 
describes your answer. Please respond to all of the items. 
 
 Do not 
agree 
Agree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree very 
much 
     
1. In order to understand my feelings of depression 
I need to ruminate about my problems 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
2. I need to ruminate about the bad things that have 
happened in the past to make sense of them 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
3. I need to ruminate about my problems to find the 
causes of my depression 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
4. Ruminating about my problems helps me to 
focus on the most important things 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
5. Ruminating about the past helps me to prevent 
future mistakes and failures 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
6. I need to ruminate about my problems to find 
answers to my depression 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
7. Ruminating about my feelings helps me to 
recognise the triggers for my depression 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
8. Ruminating about my depression helps me to 
understand past mistakes and failures 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
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NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT RUMINATION SCALE (NBRS) 
Developed by Costas Papageorgiou and Adrian Wells 
 
Instructions: Most people experience depressive thoughts at times. When depressive thinking is 
prolonged and repetitive it is called rumination. This questionnaire is concerned about the beliefs 
that people have about rumination. Listed below are a number of these beliefs. Please read each 
belief carefully and indicate how much you generally agree with each one. Please circle the 
number that best describes your answer. Please respond to all of the items. 
 Do not 
agree 
Agree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree very 
much 
     
1. Ruminating makes me physically ill 
 
1 2 3 4 
2. When I ruminate I can’t do anything else 
 
1 2 3 4 
3. Ruminating means I’m out of control 
 
1 2 3 4 
4. Everyone would desert me if they knew how 
much I ruminate about myself 
 
1 2 3 4 
5. People will reject me if I ruminate 
 
1 2 3 4 
6. Ruminating about my problems is 
uncontrollable 
 
1 2 3 4 
7. Ruminating about my depression could make 
me kill myself 
 
1 2 3 4 
8. Ruminating will turn me into a failure 
 
1 2 3 4 
9. I cannot stop myself from ruminating 
 
1 2 3 4 
10. Ruminating means I’m a bad person 
 
1 2 3 4 
11. It is impossible not to ruminate about the bad 
things that have happened in the past 
 
1 2 3 4 
12. Only weak people ruminate 
 
1 2 3 4 
13. Ruminating can make me harm myself 
 
1 2 3 4 
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The Ruminative Reponses Scale (RRS) 
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The Visual Analogue Mood Scale 
 
Please indicate your answer by placing a cross along the 0 – 100 scale. 
 
1. Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate how sad you feel at the 
present moment. 
 
  
                  0                                      50         100   
        Not at all                                             extremely 
 
2. Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate how happy you feel at the 
present moment. 
 
 
  
                  0                                      50         100   
        Not at all                                             extremely 
 
3. Please mark a cross along the scale to indicate how anxious you feel at 
the present moment. 
 
  
                  0                                      50         100   
        Not at all                                             extremely 
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The  “As-much-as-can” Stop-rule Instruction 
 
As you take part in the interview, please ask yourself 
“Have I reached the goal of thinking about ALL the possible reasons for why this 
event could have made me feel sad?”   
 If the answer is “Yes” then stop.  If the answer is “No” then continue thinking.  
There is no right or wrong time to stop.  Keep reminding yourself of the goal for 
your interview as you continue. Your goal is : 
“Have I reached the goal of considering ALL the reasons for why I might feel sad 
about the event?”    
Stop when you feel you have thought about all the possible reasons that made 
you feel sad. 
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The “Feel-like-continuing” Stop-rule Instruction 
 
 
As you take part in the task, please ask yourself 
“Do I feel like I want to continue thinking of reasons for what made me  feel sad 
about a recent event?”   If the answer is “Yes” then continue with the interview.  
If the answer is “No” stop.  There is no right or wrong time to stop.  Keep 
reminding yourself of the goal for your task as you continue. Your goal is: 
“Do I feel like I want to continue thinking of reasons for what made me feel 
sad?” 
Stop when you feel you no longer enjoy participating in the interview. 
 
 
 
